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Abstract
“The Paranoid Style in American Politics” is an accurate way to describe what happens
here. In 1966 heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali was reclassified as fully
eligible for military service; it became apparent that he would be drafted to serve in
Vietnam. Ali—contesting the government’s right to control his body—claimed his own
right to self-determination. But this question of the government’s right over the
individual became far more complicated when daily newspapers turned this conflict into
an “event.”
These newspapers imposed rigid and simplified categories on a situation that was not
easily classifiable. Muhammad Ali’s response was to identify the “gaps” within this
categorization by alternating between his various public images—including those that
newspapers tried to impose upon him. To discredit the simplistic view of the newspapers
Ali invoked complexity and contradiction.
By the time that the case reached the Supreme Court in 1971, Muhammad Ali had made
perfectly clear through his own actions—coupled with the actions of his opponents—that
he had not been given a fair hearing. The Supreme Court ruled that he should never have
been drafted in the first place, essentially saying—in stark contrast to the
characterizations of the newspaper dailies, federal employees, and agents of various state
and local government—that the entire process was, in fact, a “non-event.”
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Introduction: “Boss Trouble”

In an interview for Thomas Hauser’s biography of Muhammad Ali, published in
1991, Alex Haley reminisced about the contribution that the boxer had made to the world.
Haley suggested that for someone born after the 1960s, “someone for whom Ali is
history,” the best way to understand the man was to “not read books so much, but go to a
library where you’ll have access to daily papers and read about this man, every single day
for years. That might give you some understanding of who Muhammad Ali was and
what he meant to his people.” This thesis attempts to fulfill Haley’s suggestion for a five
year period of Muhammad Ali’s life. The following chapters begin in February 1966—
when Ali learned that the government intended to draft him for military service in
Vietnam—and end in August 1971, when the United States Supreme Court declared that
Ali did not have to answer that call. The result of this study, however, uncovers far more
than Ali’s significance to the black community.1
The majority of the proceeding investigation stems from four newspapers: The
New York Times, the Chicago Tribune, the Louisville Courier-Journal, and the Atlanta
Constitution. These papers were chosen for several reasons: the geographic area where
they were printed, socio-political bias, and their relevance to certain events in the five
year span. The New York Times employed two writers who regularly covered Ali,
Robert Lipsyte and Arthur Daley, and their opposing perspectives illustrate the wider
ideological divide about the champ. Daley, an older, more conservative sportswriter, was
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highly critical of Ali, while Lipsyte, younger and at times clearly enamored with the
boxer, supported Ali. The editors at the Chicago Tribune, following Ali’s reclassification
comments, waged an aggressive print campaign to attack the boxer and to ensure that he
would not fight in Chicago. The Courier-Journal was chosen because it was the
newspaper of Ali’s hometown in Kentucky, and Courier-Journal writers often
interviewed the boxer’s parents—Cassius and Odessa Clay, who still lived in
Louisville—for comments about their son. The Atlanta Constitution was chosen because
Ali’s first fight after his imposed exile occurred in that Georgia city, and the Atlanta
Constitution provides a stark contrast to many of the editorial habits of the three papers
mentioned above. Finally, The Times of London was used to highlight differences
between domestic and international coverage of the events. Magazines tended to provide
more rounded coverage of Muhammad Ali than did the daily newspapers mentioned
above. Articles and interviews in The Nation, Playboy magazine, Esquire, and Ebony
serve to buttress the primary sources. Film’s of Ali’s fights, as well as recorded
interviews and promotional materials, also provide insight into the champ’s personality
and physicality.
The Supreme Court decision in 1971 supplies crucial details of the legal actions
against Ali, and expands on the newspaper coverage of the events. Much of what was
revealed about the case in the Supreme Court’s decision was unknown to reporters at the
time, and necessarily calls one to question the accuracy of news coverage of the case.
Reporters did not know all the facts of the case, their conclusions were not fully
informed, and editors and reporters injected their own biases into the articles in an
attempt to impart cause, consequence, and meaning. Although it is beyond the scope of
2

this paper to suggest the consequences of the editor’s actions on public opinion at large—
which would, in effect, mirror the impulses that spurred editors to assign meaning in the
first place—this investigation does attempt to suggest “what happened?” and “why?”
Chapter One begins with the statements made by Ali about his reclassification,
and then provides background information about the boxer to place the reaction of the
print media—and especially the Chicago Tribune—into context. The Tribune, which,
aside from its’ own reports, carried stories from Reuters, United Press International, and
the Associated Press, offers a window to the stronger anti-Ali reaction; some papers were
more moderate, but few were more critical of Ali than the Tribune. Throughout the
Tribune’s coverage of Ali, and apparent in the paper’s reaction to Ali’s reclassification
comments, the boxer emerges as representative of more than a verbally defiant mindset or
mood--Muhammad Ali becomes politically, economically, morally, and physically
“dangerous.”
Ali as “dangerous,” however, did not fit neatly into the commoditized trope of the
1960s black dissident nor the violent militant. Although the Tribune, like most daily
newspapers, incorporated creatively inflammatory language about the Nation of Islam,
especially regarding Elijah Muhammad’s racial ideology and principles of self-defense,
the newspaper suggested that Ali’s stance was not an adult position, instead labeling the
boxer as a “spoiled, whining crybaby.” This contradiction is problematic: How can a
“spoiled crybaby” boxer be dangerous? The Tribune suggested that Ali was dangerous if
his “mood” was influential. But “mood” and “influence” are highly abstract, subjective,
and difficult concepts that require, at the very least, long term studies of “effect”. The
Chicago Tribune—subject to time constraints, deadlines, and public interest in Ali—
3

replaced what was chronologically impossible with instantly gratifying good copy:
speculation. The editorial staff of the Chicago Tribune predicted an alternate future; their
articles, peppered with words like “should” “could” and “would,” reported on potential
events yet to occur.
In their efforts at divination, the editors at the Tribune ignored another glaring
contradiction. The reemergence of Mafia involvement in heavyweight boxing—in the
form of Ernie Terrell—coincided with Ali’s reclassification statements. Terrell’s
manager Bernie Glickman, an associate of La Cosa Nostra crime syndicate members, had
been “marked for death” by Mafia assassins, and Terrell himself had been threatened,
albeit secondhand. Terrell’s associations are explored to demonstrate a more concrete
concept of danger—death threats, grand larceny, fraud, criminal conspiracies—and his
Mafia involvement forces the question: between Muhammad Ali and Ernie Terrell, who
was more dangerous?
But Ali was not merely labeled “dangerous,” he actively engaged in the
construction of his own public persona, and following the failure of his Chicago fight, Ali
answered his opponents with a different mediated image of himself. Internationally, Ali
presented himself as gracious, humble, and kind, and no less willing to defend himself
against news reporters. Where before Ali had publicly claimed that he was alone—“the
onliest heavyweight champ”—he now connected himself to his racial and spiritual
contemporaries internationally. Ali’s ability to connect to his international supporters
was significantly enhanced by developments in telecommunications, as satellites carried
his fights around the globe. International viewers saw a man who could not be beaten in
the ring, and they read his criticisms of news reporters and politicians—translated into
4

scores of languages—in international newspapers. By 1967 Ali, bolstered by his
international fans, was holding his own—if not winning—the battle against his critics in
the print media. His fight against Ernie Terrell, his second to last fight of the 1960s, and
a fight that shocked sportswriters and fans alike, was proof of Ali’s unrivaled physical
power. The fight was also evidence of Ali’s ability to win not only public support (for
the fight was a brutal one) but self-determination and a form of individuality. In his fight
against Terrell, Ali shrugged off the media’s commoditized version of dissent that had
been assigned to him and instead exhibited a personalized defiance, an anger and cruelty
that was directed as much toward the print media as it was toward Ernie Terrell’s broken
face.
Until the summer of 1967 Ali had not broken any major law, but once he refused
to step forward those positioned against him used the event to act. If Ali was winning the
“image” contest internationally, his opponents used the “non-step” to strip Ali of his
ability to reinforce that image. Through two separate acts, Ali could neither box nor
travel abroad. Effectively denied the ability to promote himself, Ali focused on legal
appeals and odd jobs, and his “image” shifted. Chapter Two, which begins with Ali’s
refusal to be inducted into the United States Army, turns to the events between 19671971.
Ali’s new “image”—refined through his tours of the college lecture circuit—
emerged as a mixture of Nation of Islam doctrine and Ali’s own vernacular style, humor,
and braggadocio. But as dissent within the United States grew more violent, the Nation
of Islam’s concept of self-defense stood in stark contrast to the programs of black
militants and political revolutionaries. The more belligerent statements of the Nation of
5

Islam were essentially a defense mechanism against entrenched white power, a statement
of power by the powerless, and Elijah Muhammad recognized this. Elijah Muhammad, a
separatist, did not encourage followers to engage in direct armed conflict with the power
of the state. Instead, Nation of Islam doctrine asserted that Allah would deliver
retribution for white crimes against African Americans. If Muhammad Ali’s sociopolitical “image”—created by both the champ and the popular press—was sympathetic to
black revolution, his religious beliefs—influenced extensively by Elijah Muhammad-considered such violence unnecessary. In essence Ali’s social message, although radical,
appeared moderate compared to the calls to action of the Revolutionary Action
Movement or the Black Panther Party.
Ali also stood apart from the larger ant-war movement. He did not engage in acts
of civil disobedience, as did other religious dissenters like Philip and Daniel Berrigan—
Catholic priests who actively tried to destroy induction records at draft offices. Nor did
he flee the country or hide from authorities, as did Daniel Berrigan; Ali remained visible,
and he often reminded reporters that he was willing to go to prison for his beliefs.
Furthermore, Muhammad Ali did not participate in mass demonstrations of protest
against the war, and thus escaped the wrath of the coercive powers of the state, whose
powers were on full display in the summer of 1968 in Chicago. Again, compared to more
active opponents of the Vietnam War and the military draft, Ali appeared relatively
moderate.2
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The divergence between these various “images”, however, suggests that the
actions of the state, and state appointees, against Ali were more concerned with one
“image.” Fears of an impending armed revolution in the United States spurred
government officials to react decisively, evident in the espionage conducted domestically
by the CIA and Army Intelligence, as well as in the violent 1968 Democratic National
Convention and the reactivation of the 1902 New York Criminal Anarchy Law. Ali’s
“image” as one of many leaders of this projected revolution led to his persecution. This
is not to minimize the violent potential of the various dissident groups, many of whom
were considerably well armed and organized; instead it serves to show that Ali did not fit
neatly into the “armed revolutionary” category. In other words, one of Ali’s “images”
was martyred on the altar of an imagined atavistic social order, while another “image”
resonated in an area adjacent to, but disconnected from, armed black militancy and street
level protest.
Ali himself stood parallax to all groups involved—the state and black militants,
the mass media and Ali’s international supporters, war hawks and the anti-war movement
within the military itself—and if he was persecuted for one “image” he was exonerated
by the Supreme Court for another. Over three years after Ali refused to step forward, his
message showed no discernible active effect—it was utopian, but African Americans did
not join the Nation of Islam in great numbers nor did they resist the draft based on
religious principles. His message and his individual physical power were not enough to
combat, on any form of mass material scale, the forces of the state or the opinions of the
print media. But his “image,” which existed in millions of hearts and minds
internationally, that “haunted the dreams of administrators everywhere,” this image of a
7

dancing, bragging heavyweight boxer who “whupped all the bums”—including those in
the print media and government—was undeniably powerful on the astral plane of
representation, perceived consequence, and projected meaning.
In this astral plane Ali was projected globally. Through news and television
coverage his “image” existed in millions of places simultaneously and symbolized a host
of issues. His message, once refined, was static, but his “image” was constantly built
upon and manipulated by all involved—including Ali—to incorporate all causes and
consequences. It was this highly contentious property that various and unconnected
individuals sought to control. Judge Joe Ingraham, who denied Ali the ability to travel
abroad, and Edwin Dooley, who stripped Ali of his boxing title and revoked his license to
fight, attempted to halt Ali’s ability to contribute to his international “image”; they
instead contributed to the “myth” of Ali’s persecution and eventual triumph. After
Muhammad Ali regained the heavyweight championship title in 1974, Chicago Mayor
Richard Daley awarded Ali the “Key to the City of Chicago,” President Gerald Ford
welcomed Ali to the White House, and D.C. Comics published a special issue of
Superman where Ali fought the Man of Steel and won.3
“When Ali came back from exile,” Jim Brown told Thomas Hauser, “he became
the darling of America, which was good for America because it brought black and white
together. But the Ali that America ended up loving was not the Ali that I loved most . . .
In a way he became part of the establishment . . . [But] Ali, before he came back, was a
true warrior. He was above sports, he was part of history. The man used his athletic
3
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ability to project himself right up there with world leaders. Ali was involved in the
Vietnam War. Ali was involved in the struggle for racial equality. To do what he did, to
achieve the pinnacle of his profession, to fight for freedom for black people, to perform
while being ostracized and still be a champion; Jackie Robinson died from that, and Ali
was able to prevail.”4
Few individuals of the second half of the twentieth century have been written
about as much as Muhammad Ali. Aside from hundreds of promotional writings aimed
mostly at children or die hard fans, there have been countless magazine articles and
biographies that focus, more often than not, on Ali’s boxing career. Few of these have
any merit aside from entertainment, and some contain questionable facts or comments
(postcards of Ali’s face are still sold in Louisville that read “The Greatest: Cassius Clay,”
although the photograph is obviously of the boxer after his return to the ring). A growing
catalog of academic literature covering Ali is beginning to emerge, however, and
although these too contain discrepancies, they provide a background to the primary
research conducted in this essay.
What’s My Name: Black Vernacular Intellectuals places Ali’s anti-war and black
power comments into the category of the vernacular intellectual. Grant Fareed argues
that Ali was a verbally self-defined individual who activated traditions in the AfricanAmerican discourse–poetry and self promotion, as well as Ali’s grammatical style and his
criticism of the white power structure—and Fareed contends that this “vernacularity” is
what made Ali accessible to the international audience. Ali emerged as a global figure at

4
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a crucial stage in the postcolonial experience, and his self-defined role as critic of white
Western colonial practices—whether in Africa, Asia, or in the American ghettos—
garnered as much domestic opposition as it did international enthusiasm. Fareed—a
professor of literature—deconstructs the discourse of Ali and that of his “colonialist”
opposition, and reconstructs the process of self-definition that Ali undertook. His essay
covers a broader period of Ali’s life, and Fareed explores Ali’s departure from the
oppositional vernacular, his endorsement for Ronald Reagan in the 1980 Presidential
election is one example, in an effort to “demystify” the champ. Cataloging contradictions
and inconsistencies about Ali, however, fails to provide a “more human” Ali, and Fareed
shows an obvious bias for the boxer.5
Fareed’s conclusions are sound, and although they are fascinating they provide an
incomplete picture. The work fails to incorporate the opposition’s role in the creation of
Ali’s image; this robs Ali’s detractors of the ability to similarly self-define and they
become simply “racist” reporters or seemingly mindless automatons of the state. Fareed
also fails to explain that while postcolonial African and Asian nations were emerging
from foreign occupation, the United States, despite possible “colonial” imperatives in
Vietnam, was attempting to present itself as an altruistic defender of “democracy”. Ali’s
vernacular intellectualism was able to reach so many internationally because the boxer
was able to use a tool of U.S. cultural diplomacy—mass communication of popular
culture through satellites—to promote his postcolonial discourse.6

5
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Redemption Song connects Ali to the developing radicalism of the late 1960s,
especially the turn to black militancy in Northern cities. Marqusse argues that black
power was a vindication of Nation of Islam doctrine, which had previously been viewed
with skepticism in most areas of the black community. If the turn to black power seemed
to stem from the Nation, the growing opposition to the war in Vietnam seemed to justify
Ali’s reluctance to fight. Marqusse—an American expatriate writing in England—rejects
the assumption that Ali represents a symbol of American exceptionalism and places the
boxer into an international context of revolution and opposition. As a result of Ali’s
connection to the international community, Marqusse argues, the boxer stood ahead of
the American socio-political curve; Ali was ahead of his time. As a pioneer of 1960s
American oppositional politics, Ali was reviled until public opinion caught up to him.7
Marqusse, like Fareed, seeks to “demystify” Ali—both cite the 1996 Olympic
Games as primary causes for this—but despite presenting the contradictions of the fighter
in later life, Marqusse’s book venerates Ali. His scope extends into Ali’s later years, and
Marqusse focuses more on Ali’s support networks, from contemporaries in the Civil
Rights movement to liberal white journalists like Howard Cosell and George Plimpton,
than he does on Ali’s opponents. The lack of footnotes in both Fareed and Marqusse—
and some inconsistencies and surprising factual embellishments8—leads both books to
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fall short of historical research. Like Ali’s detractors (and supporters) in the newspapers,
the lack of citation (which accompanies constant variations in descriptions of events)
hinders the ability to reconstruct the facts of the case, thereby calling the opinions derived
into question.9
Thomas Hauser’s authorized oral biography Muhammad Ali: His Life and Times
provides first person interviews with those involved and affected by the boxer. The book
is well researched and documented and provides many “takes” on Ali, most of them
positive. With little exception the book focuses on Ali’s life, and the only discussions of
process or impact come from individual interviewee opinion. John Cottrell’s Muhammad
Ali, Who Once Was Cassius Clay, written before Ali was exonerated by the Supreme
Court, also focuses on Ali’s life and does not attempt to place Ali into larger contexts.
Ali’s autobiography The Greatest, written in the mid-1970s, is a fascinating account, but
contains the boxer’s penchant for self promotion and exaggeration that limits its’ use as a
primary historical text. In Ghosts of Manila, former Sports Illustrated reporter Mark
Kram recounts the three Ali/ Frazier fights. The book is very unfavorable to Ali and
claims that Joe Frazier was the true hero of the three fights. Ali, to Kram, was a spoiled
charlatan. Nick Tosches’s The Devil and Sonny Liston also portrays Ali in a negative
light. Tosches claims that Liston, not Ali, was the 60s political figure, and he
characterizes Ali as a flaky, immature, self-promoter.10
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Frederic Jaher’s “White America Views Jack Johnson, Joe Louis, and Muhammad
Ali” in Sport In America argues that American public opinion shifted to Ali’s point of
view about the Vietnam War and the draft in light of the prospect of continued racial
hostility and the “legitimacy of nonconformist athletes.” Jaher claims that Ali was ahead
of his time, but he also argues that the rebellions of the 1960s and seventies ended in an
“uneasy truce” with the establishment—there was no resolution to the issues—and that
the consensus about Ali illustrates this. (Jaher’s article was published in 1985) The
article is well-researched and documented, but Jaher also makes a questionable claim—
that an attempted assassination of Ali occurred before his return to the ring. This claim is
mentioned in no other source, primary or secondary, and Jaher provides no details about
the attempt. 11
This thesis also draws on secondary sources that do not mention Ali, but are
nonetheless relevant in terms of methodology. In “House Negro versus Field Negro:
The Inscribed Image of Race in Television News Representations of African-American
Identity,” contained in Say IT Loud: African-American Audiences, Media, and Identity,
Jennifer F. Wood provides a sociological study of media coverage of blacks. Wood
argues that the television news media presents African American actors in the opposing
categories of “Uncle Tom or Nat Turner”. Wood cites the retirement of Edward R.
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Murrow—who provided “excellent” coverage of blacks—as the beginning of this bias in
television news coverage, a bias that Wood argues continues to this day.12
In Necessary Illusions: Thought Control in Democratic Society, Noam Chomsky
details the state’s role in setting the terms of media debate. The role of media, Chomsky
argues, is to mobilize the elites in a community. These elites, in concert with the media
and the state, set the terms for “thinkable thought.” Chomsky uses the war in Vietnam as
an example: the terms of debate about the war itself (defined by these three parties)
precluded any debate about “American aggression” because the agents of thought
ensured that such a category did not exist within the media debate. The United States
was “protecting” or “defending” democracy, and “defensive” positions cannot be
“aggressive.” Those who strayed from the “allowed” debate were placed within predetermined categories of dissent; the critics of the war were either Communist
sympathizers, “Hanoi partisans,” or else were hiding a “secret agenda” that predisposed
them to anti-Americanism. In regards to internal dissent, Chomsky continues, the state
maintained a defensive posture in the debate—the state defends freedom while silencing
dissent while promoting democracy.13
Ali’s relationship with the press fell into this process. Ali condemned the War,
not through in-depth analysis of foreign policy but because of white colonial imperatives
that connected the Vietcong with African Americans. To Ali, the same impulse that led
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to the deployment of troops to Southeast Asia led to the existence of a black Diaspora in
the United States. Critics in the media tried to fit Ali into one or more of the categories
of dissent (“Nat Turner” with a “secret agenda,” etc.) but the fit was not a comfortable
one. In studying Ali from 1967 to 1971 we can see the difficult nature of this process,
its’ imperfections, and we can see how the emergence of global communications systems
complicated state attempts at identification and individual attempts at dissent.
Schiller’s “Transformation of News in the U.S. Information Market” in
Communicating Politics and Page’s Who Deliberates? Focus on corporate involvement in
news coverage. Schiller provides a sociological and anthropological study of the
commercialization and automization of news—beginning with the wire services of the
1950s—that split news between elite channels like the New York Times and more
popular outlets like local dailies and television coverage. To Schiller, elite news provides
“responsible” information while the popular news tends to focus on the “exciting” worlds
of crime and scandal and “enjoyable” content such as sports or personal interest stories.
Popular news, to Schiller, is answering the demands of advertisers to appeal to the
broadest demographics. 14
Page, in Who Deliberates?, contends that the size of the public, combined with the
complexities of political policymaking, hinders any sort of mass public deliberation—a
national “town meeting”—and instead gives rise to the “professional communicator.”
These “professional communicators” are not chosen democratically, although ratings
14
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reports may give the illusion of a democratic process, but are instead selected by private,
profit seeking corporations. Page echoes Chomsky’s claim that political content is meant
to target “opinion leaders” of a community who then disseminate information to
“ordinary citizens.” Page questions whether corporate-controlled media and their
“professional communicators” can stifle or skew democratic participation or mislead the
public, and he investigates the effects of the corporate two-party political system in
limiting coverage of diverse opinion. In the case of Muhammad Ali, the majority of
“professional communicators” mobilized in opposition to the boxer, as did the two-party
political system of the country. However, Page’s book does not focus on the 1960s,
when a fracturing of the popular political debate gave the appearance of distinct and
disconnected interests at work in Ali’s treatment. The mass media, despite evidence of
corporate control, is not monolithic, and far more than profits drives the construction,
creation, and dissemination of news content.15
In addition to the works noted above, Leinwoll’s From Spark to Satellite,
Mattelart’s Networking the World, and Oslin’s Story of Telecommunications provided a
history of the global communication technology that allowed Ali to connect to his
international base. In the mid 1960s these satellites were new and contentious
technology, and Ali’s case is but one instance of the competition for control of
international communication. Michael Lieb’s Children of Ezekiel connects modern
sightings of U.F.O.’s to Ezekiel’s vision of God’s chariot, and traces Ezekiel’s prophecy
to the Nation of Islam’s “mother ship” and Biblical images of a race-based technological
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Armageddon. Representing Sport and Sport, Culture, and Media delineate the
possibilities and consequences of representation and attribution in the highly controlled
environment of professional sports; they also examine corporate interest in making sport
accessible to a worldwide audience, and the dangers associated with the ideological
manipulation of physical image. Todd Gitlin’s The Sixties: Years of Hope, Days of
Rage provided context for U.S. social and cultural developments, and George Moss’s
Vietnam: An American Ordeal supplied secondary information on the Vietnam War. 16
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Chapter One: “’In Footsteps of the Pharaohs’: Muhammad Ali,
Newspapers, and Communicating “Danger,” 1966-1967”

On Valentine’s Day 1968 Murray Schumach of the New York Times reported that
Madison Square Garden would be demolished to make way for a new Garden across the
street. The Garden stood on 8th avenue, the old site of Barnum’s Circus, which opened in
1874. The first boxing matches were held at the Garden in 1877 and, because
prizefighting was illegal at the time, they were promoted as “scientific sparring
exhibitions between professors.” That building was demolished in 1890 and replaced
with an ornate structure replete with cupolas and Moorish archways and topped with a
nude statue of Diana the Huntress designed by Augustus Saint-Gaudens. Boxing
remained illegal, and the second Garden—under the management of the Vanderbilt
family—hosted horse and dog shows, bicycle races, ballets, and performances by the
glitterati of the day, most notably Sarah Bernhardt. The second Garden struggled
financially, however, until boxing became legal in 1920.17
The last event at the second Garden was a boxing match, held on 5 May 1925.
Announcer Joe Humphreys, after quieting the crowd, read a poem through the public
address system. “Farewell to thee, O Temple of Fistiana,” he intoned, as taps played in
the background. The structure was demolished shortly thereafter to make way for the
third Garden, overseen by Tex Richard, the “first notable boxing promoter to dominate
the Garden.” This Garden, wrote Schumach, had been a “sports palace, political
17
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battleground, town hall of the nation, magnet for circuses and fund drives, temple for
evangelists, forum for crusaders, [and] a stage for many of the greatest performing
artists.” Politicians attempting to capitalize on captive sports crowds were often booed
off the stage, and Elizabeth Taylor threw an infamous Hollywood Party there that
resulted in thousands of dollars of damage to the building.18
In 1949 “millionaire sportsman” James D. Norris bought a boxing interest at the
Garden, and controlled all championship fights in the arena until he was charged by the
state with Mafia collusion for “monopolizing championship titles.” Many of the greatest
gambling scandals in sports were played out under the roof of the third Garden, wrote
Schumach, especially those involving boxers and basketball players. Harry Markson, the
boxing director for the Garden in 1968—and himself under investigation for Mafia ties—
commented that the growing worldwide coverage of boxing events had changed the
dynamic of the business of prizefighting. Increased television coverage of fights had put
smaller boxing venues out of business, he said, as fans preferred to “[get] a closer look at
the fights through television.” As an even larger and more technologically advanced
arena was being constructed--designed to accommodate the growing popularity and
subsequent demand for coverage of boxing--across the street from the arena, the third
Garden’s last event was the Westminster Dog Show, followed by the wrecking ball.19
The story above provides insight into the major themes of this chapter. The sport
of boxing, evident from the earliest matches at the Garden to the 1968 investigations into
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Mafia collusion with promoters, had always existed on the fringes of legality. A steady
stream of criminal hustlers and professional gamblers, no doubt attracted to the enormous
sums of money that the controlled violence of the sport generated, remained on-hand to
influence fighters and referees, or to protect investments and ensure payoffs. The sport
was dangerous—physically and legally—and always had been. But when the
heavyweight champion of the world, Muhammad Ali, fought his last fight of the 1960s in
Madison Square Garden against Zora Folley in 1967, the boxing world was, in a highly
abstract way, subject to a new form of danger. If the Garden, as Murray Schumach
wrote, was an arena for sports, a political stage and national town hall, a site of circuses,
evangelical missions, and a destination for performing artists, twenty-five year old
Muhammad Ali embodied all of these divergent strands in a single six-foot four frame.
Ali was a sports hero, a political figure, an evangelist, and an unmatched physical artist
who presided over a veritable socio-political circus that he himself inaugurated.
Muhammad Ali also stood as a central figure in raising awareness of boxing: his
physicality, mixed with his socio-political beliefs, generated international interest in the
sport, and necessitated the construction of a new, technologically advanced Garden that
catered to television coverage rather than to live audiences. When Muhammad Ali boxed
the world watched, but witnesses saw far more than displays of physical dexterity.
Viewers observed a conflict of contested social, religious, and cultural imagery carried
through the ether; when Muhammad Ali won a fight—and in the 1960s he always won—
the victory was not the champ’s alone but signaled a triumph for his socio-political
discourse, for his image and representation, and a defeat for those forces opposed to his
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individual self-definition. Muhammad Ali was not dangerous in the way that criminals or
gangsters were dangerous, Muhammad Ali was dangerous for what he represented.
This chapter explores the manipulation of those representations in the
communications media. When Muhammad Ali learned that he was eligible for induction
into the Armed Forces, his response was based on—and connected him to—his various
public images. Muhammad Ali’s reclassification remarks sparked a contest over these
public images between the boxer and his opponents in the print media. Ali’s opposition
attempted to define the boxer based on select statements and associations, but by
highlighting only certain areas of Ali’s situation they left considerable gaps in coverage.
Ali—recognizing the gaps—responded by fluidly transitioning between his several
different public images. His ability to “dance” between these various personas, and his
highly physical performances (both inside and outside of the ring) exposed contradictions
in print accounts, allowing Ali to counter the negative abstractions assigned to him.
Beginning with an examination of these personas, this chapter explores how Ali
consolidated these various images into a new one, an image that stood in opposition to
the war in Vietnam. Ali was not solely responsible for the construction of his image,
however, and this thesis shows how the print media contributed to this process by
selectively incorporating certain characteristics of these personas. The result was a battle
for definition—illustrated in the Chicago Tribune’s campaign to ban an Ali fight—that
culminated in an exchange between Muhammad Ali and the Illinois State Athletic
Commission in 1966.
The Chicago Tribune’s image of Ali was created by incorporating select features
of Ali’s various images, but in this process the paper ignored other important
21

characteristics. Notably absent in the Tribune’s coverage is the continued involvement of
Mafia figures in boxing—personified by Ali’s opponent Ernie Terrell—a situation that
would have damaged the newspaper’s claims that Ali was dangerous. Through the
manipulation of circumstance, the Tribune won the initial image war against Muhammad
Ali, who was not controlled by criminal elements, by claiming that Ali was more of a
threat to order than was Ernie Terrell or La Cosa Nostra crime syndicate. After losing
this battle, however, Ali activated other avenues of support to combat his opponents in
the domestic press.
Following the failure of the Chicago fight, Muhammad Ali focused on generating
international support. He countered the influence of the domestic press by harnessing the
power of an emerging technology—international satellite communications—and
essentially broadcast his image over the heads of the United States media outlets. Ali
was able, through his incredible athletic ability, his position as an African American
celebrity, his critiques of the quasi-imperialist policies of the United States both
domestically and internationally, and his conversion to Islam, to appeal to millions
around the globe. In sum, Ali was holding his own against a host of opponents (in the
ring and the media). This chapter concludes with the realization that Ali, however
unpopular domestically, was essentially unstoppable—unbeatable in the ring and, despite
an early loss to the Chicago Tribune, able to rally international support in the face of his
critics. This chapter begins with the events of a day in mid-February 1966.
____________________________________________
On February 17, 1966, the heavyweight boxing champion of the world-Muhammad Ali--was sitting in front of his rented concrete bungalow in Miami, where he
22

was training for a bout with Ernie Terrell. On weekday afternoons after training, Ali
would sit in his lawn chair and play with the children that came to visit him everyday
after school. This was a striking and recurrent image, that of a massive and violent man
displaying a gentle delicacy with the children that he towered above. He would ask the
young boys and girls about their studies, sing songs for them, and often Ali would hold
foot races for the children, rewarding the victors with dollar bills and high praise. It was
in this setting, surrounded by children, that Ali learned that the selective service board in
Louisville, Kentucky had reclassified him 1-A—meaning fully eligible for military
service—from an earlier evaluation of 1-Y.20
Ali’s classification of 1-Y had resulted from his failure of three pre-induction
mental aptitude tests in 1964. The score of 1-Y sparked speculation in the press that Ali
(Cassius Clay at the time) had been deliberately dishonest with the board and had
intentionally failed the tests. In a 1964 Playboy interview with Alex Haley, Ali responded
to those claims with a guarded humility by saying, “The truth don’t hurt nobody. The
fact is I never was too bright in school. I just barely graduated . . . [with] a D-minus
average. I ain’t ashamed of it, though. I mean, how much do school principals make in a
month?” He continued, “when I looked at a lot of the questions [on the test] . . . I didn’t
even know how to start after finding the answers. So I didn’t pass. It was the Army’s
decision that they didn’t want me . . . I don’t want to say no whole lot about it.” When
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Haley asked Ali if he found the poor scores embarrassing, Ali replied: “I have said I am
the greatest. Ain’t nobody ever heard me say I was the smartest.”21
As reporters started to call and television news vans pulled up to Ali’s bungalow
to get comments about the champ’s reclassification, Ali’s words were far less selfdeprecating. “Why me? Why me?” he said. “I don’t understand why they’re picking on
me.” The Chicago Tribune quoted Ali as saying: “If they’d just let me fight, I could pay
for two modern airplanes in two fights, or I could pay the salaries of 100,000 men. I’m
fighting for the government everyday . . . [in] a game nine out of ten soldiers wouldn’t
want to take part in. It’s too dangerous.” Between comments, New York Times reporter
Robert Lipsyte wrote, Ali would ask a sixth grade girl about her studies or sing a verse
form Bob Dylan’s “Blowin' in the Wind.” Ali then echoed his 1964 sentiment claiming
that the label of less than average intelligence had been imposed upon him. “For two
years the Army told everybody I was a nut, and I was ashamed. And now they decide
I’m a wise man without testing me to see if I am wiser or worser than before.” He then
connected himself to his contemporaries in the sports world, albeit in an oppositional
manner. “I can’t understand why, out of all the baseball players, all of the football
players, all of the basketball players they seek out me, the onliest heavyweight champion
in the world.”22
Lipsyte, who was with Ali during these interviews, reported that Ali was “panicstricken” at the thought of the Army. Several of his friends in the Nation of Islam,
21
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Lipsyte continued, had told Ali horror stories of the violently segregated Army. As the
calls for comments continued, Ali focused on his own economic success. Why pay him
eighty dollars a day, he asked, “when the government is in trouble financially? I think it
costs 12 million dollars a day to stay in Vietnam, and I buy a lot of bullets, at least three
jet bombers a year, and pay the salary of 50,000 fighting men with the money they take
from me after my fights,” he told Lipsyte. “President Johnson is a wise man,” the
Chicago Tribune printed “and maybe he’ll call some people up and change this . . . I’m
just saying maybe.”23
Ali also responded to the reclassification in terms of his religion, Islam. He
reminded reporters that Muslims around the world were watching him, and “maybe
they’ll be angry about this.” It was not until the next day, however, that Ali responded
with his signature quote. “I am a member of the Muslims and we don’t go to wars unless
they are declared by Allah himself,” he began. “All I know is that [the Viet Cong] are
considered as Asiatic black people and I don’t have no fight with black people.” Ali,
encapsulating his powerful socio-religious perspective, then declared “I don’t have no
personal quarrel with those Viet Congs.” Although these comments sparked a firestorm
of criticism within the print media, Ali had already been held in contempt by sectors of
the public and print media for his association with the Nation of Islam, a radical sociopolitical religion led by Elijah Muhammad.24
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The first sign of Ali’s involvement in the controversial nation arose immediately
after his heavyweight championship victory against Sonny Liston. He announced to
reporters that he had changed his name to Cassius X—later changed to the Muslim name
Muhammad Ali--in order to free himself from the “slave name” of Cassius Clay.
Newspapers in the United States and the United Kingdom, however, refused to accept
Ali’s new name and, thus, his new image. His hometown newspaper, the Louisville
Courier-Journal, covered the actions of “Cassius Clay” from 1965-1967 with no mention
of Muhammad Ali. The Chicago Tribune also continued to use the name Clay, as did the
Atlanta Constitution, which in one article changed Stokely Carmichael’s words from Ali
to Clay. The magazine The Nation preferred the name Clay as well, and seldom
mentioned Muhammad Ali.25
The Times of London and the New York Times also refused to use the name Ali.
The British newspaper used the name Cassius, with few exceptions, until 1970 when his
case was before the Supreme Court. And the New York Times, carrying the story of
Ali’s first reactions to his reclassification, called him Clay with no mention of
Muhammad Ali until the ninth paragraph of the body. But the print media was not
monolithic in it’s denial of Ali’s right to self-definition. The articles of reporter Robert
Lipsyte, who fought his editors to use the name Muhammad Ali, used the name Cassius
Clay exclusively. Lipsyte avoided the awkward “Cassius Clay AKA Muhammad Ali”
used by many reporters and instead filed his articles using the name Ali. When editors
changed every mention of Ali back to Clay, the articles were left devoid of any reference
25
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to Ali. But Lipsyte was in the minority. His fellow sportswriter Arthur Daley refused to
use the name Ali at all. After Floyd Patterson wrote a Sports Illustrated article that was
sympathetic to the champ, Ali complained that Patterson had insisted on calling him
Clay. “Don’t worry Cassius old boy,” responded Daley in his sports column “he’s not
the only one.”26
If Ali’s name change caused a stir, the reasons for the change—his conversion to
the Muslim religion and his involvement with the Nation of Islam--were unacceptable to
many writers, who presented their own image of the organization. The Courier-Journal
labeled the Nation of Islam a “Negro-supremacist sect” that criticized Martin Luther
King, Jr. as representing “the white man’s black man.” To the Chicago Tribune, the
Nation was a “Negro Supremacy cult” comprised of “phony Muslims” whose violent
behavior was a threat to public safety. The New York Times also incorporated the words
“cult” and “sect” into their descriptions of the organization, and described followers as “a
band of thugs” that had “rejected the mainstream of American life.” The trial of those
accused of assassinating former Nation of Islam member Malcolm X provides a telling
example of both the print media’s coverage of the Nation of Islam and the public’s
response to Muhammad Ali’s association with the organization.27
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Malcolm X was murdered at the Audubon ballroom in Harlem shortly after 3:30
PM on 21 February 1965. Malcolm had split with Nation of Islam but remained a
dedicated Muslim, and following his death many speculated that he had been killed for
denouncing Elijah Muhammad as a racist and a philanderer. Many Associated Press and
UPI wire reports described the assassination as a gunfight between violent gangsters, and
these stereotypes were perpetuated in the ensuing weeks. Malcolm’s supporters promised
violent reprisals, and a fire in Ali’s apartment on 23 February 1965 sparked fears that he
would be assassinated in retaliation. Three men accused of killing Malcolm, Talmadge
Hayer, Norman 3X Butler, and Thomas 15X Johnson, were arrested and put on trial in
New York.28
On 5 March 1966, in the last days of the trial, Muhammad Ali’s name was raised
by the prosecution in connection with the Nation, and specifically with defendant
Norman 3X Butler, whom the prosecutor asked if he had worked as Ali’s bodyguard.
Butler’s attorney, William Chance, demanded the judge declare a mistrial because of “the
light in which Clay had been cast.” Charles Beavers, attorney for another defendant,
agreed that the prosecution had attempted to prejudice the jury by bringing up Ali's name,
and similarly called for a mistrial. The judge refused, and on 11 March 1966 all three
defendants were found guilty. A month later they were sentenced to life in prison.29
A month before the three men were found guilty, Muhammad Ali appeared in
court to plead guilty to a charge of “disorderly conduct” resulting from a traffic stop in
28
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December 1965. Ali had been a passenger in a car that was stopped for improper
registration tags. When the officer approached the car, the Chicago Tribune reported, Ali
stepped out of the car and, after a verbal exchange with the officer, had dared the
policeman to hit him. The officer arrested Ali, and in February 1966 he pled guilty to the
charge and paid a 50-dollar fine. This incident was Ali’s sole brush with the law before
1966--hardly enough to justify the negative reaction sparked by the prosecution’s
mention of his name—when Ali appeared in court over a personal matter.30
Ali’s name appeared in court proceedings between February and April 1966, as a
result of his divorce from Sonji Roy, and reporters used the divorce proceedings to depict
Ali as an irresponsible religious zealot who rejected the authority of law. The two had
been married in 1964, and less than two months before his Army reclassification they had
divorced. In February 1966, Sonji’s lawyer declared that he would take Ali’s new red
Cadillac convertible and his $8,000 wardrobe as partial payment for $22,500 that Ali
owed to pay Sonji’s attorney fees. In April, Sonji appeared in court to report that Ali had
not paid the $1,250 a month in alimony in the months since their divorce. Ali did not
appear in court and was held in contempt by the presiding judge, who threatened to send
the champ to jail if he did not pay. By July 1966 a judge demanded that Ali purchase a
$50,000 alimony bond and again threatened to send him to jail if he refused to pay, once
again holding him in contempt for failure to appear. Ali’s personal lawyer, Edward
Jacko, told the judge that he would not have the money until his next fight.31
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On 27 March 1966 the Louisville Courier-Journal ran a story that suggested that
Ali had been reclassified 1-A as a direct result of his divorce from Sonji. The paper
reported that had Ali not been divorced he would not have been eligible for the draft at
the time he was reclassified. His 1-A status came “almost immediately” after the divorce.
Ali remarked that his divorce from Sonji resulted from her refusal to follow Muslim
customs, especially regarding restrictions on female dress. If the Courier Journal’s
speculation about the divorce causing his reclassification was correct, then Ali’s claims in
the New York Times that the government was “picking on him” for his affiliation with
the Nation of Islam was not far from the mark, albeit ignoring his own action of
divorcing Sonji for her failure to meet Nation of Islam requirements.32
Whatever the cause of the draft boards actions, Ali’s response to reporters in
February 1966 caused bitter reactions—not the least in Chicago, where Ali was set to
meet Ernie Terrell in a match on March 29. Winnifred Phillips, chief selective service
clerk of Jefferson County, (where Louisville is located) Kentucky assured reporters that
Ali would not be called until the April draft, which would not interfere with the Terrell
fight. The New York State Athletic Commission had refused to grant a license to the
fight prior to the champ’s reclassification comments, but once Ali quotes appeared in
newspapers nationwide, the Chicago Tribune initiated a campaign to drive the fight out of
Chicago. This was an image war.33
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On 19 February—one day after the story broke—the Tribune printed an unsigned
editorial asserting that the paper had been correct in previously asking that the city of
Chicago be spared “the spectacle of a would be draft dodger defending his title” against
another fighter who was ineligible for duty. Ernie Terrell, who stood at six-feet sixinches, was too tall to be drafted, but remarked in all seriousness that “no matter how
much money you make, when you’re called you have to go. This is the way it should
be.” The editorial further claimed that “sucker spectators” and Chicagoans in general
were “unwittingly encouraging [Ali] by their interest in a fight whose profits” would fund
the Nation of Islam. The editorial concluded that Ali should be fighting in Viet Nam, not
Illinois.34
The editorial ran the same day that Ali suggested that “millions of Muslims” were
watching the events unfold. A Tribune reporter interviewed Joe Triner, the head of the
Illinois State Athletic Commission, who disagreed with Ali’s comments but replied that
the outburst was no reason to cancel the fight because “Lots of people have bought
tickets in hopes of seeing him get his block knocked off.” The next day the Illinois
chapter of the American Legion complained to Governor Kerner and two state legislators
protested the licensing of the fight. Democratic State Senator Thomas McGloon
suggested that the athletic commission call “this Muhammad—whatever his name is” and
clarify his statements about the Army, and then examine its’ decision to allow the fight.
State Representative Lawrence Pussteri, a Republican, demanded that the commission
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cancel the fight immediately. Governor Kerner responded that he left the decision to the
commission.35
The Tribune carried two stories on February 20 that exposed their intentions. One
reporter, under the auspices of a factual report, speculated that the Louisville draft board
could still act in time to cancel the fight. Selective service, the reporter noted, would
have to act quickly, but it could happen. The reporter seemed to believe that such an
outcome was desirable. Members of the athletic commission remained reluctant, when
asked by the Tribune, to cancel the fight. Commission member Lou Radzienda called Ali
a “mouthy kid,” but affirmed Ali’s “right to his own opinion and . . . freedom of
expression.” “His statements have nothing to do with boxing,” continued Radzienda,
who remarked that several politicians and bankers opposed the war but still received the
community’s business. Apparently unsatisfied, a reporter for the Tribune called Joe
Robichaux, another commission member. Robichaux had not read Ali’s comments and
he snapped at the Tribune reporter “It is the duty of the commission to make decisions
without coercion from anybody!”36
The campaign continued. On 21 February the Chicago Tribune carried nine
stories about Ali, the athletic commission, and the fight. A Tribune reporter, dispatched
to a nearby Army hospital, interviewed wounded GIs recently returned from Vietnam
about Ali’s statements. Few felt sympathy for the boxer. The paper unearthed details of
Ali’s December 1965 arrest and printed the story. A reporter interviewed Ali’s ex-wife
35
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Sonji about her feelings—“He should fight,” she said—and carried the story separately,
while a banner headline on the sports page announced: “Clay and Muslim Pals Figure to
Strike It Rich Here” with the subhead “Estimate Their Take At Over a Million.” In the
text of another article, the writer reported that the Nation of Islam believed the white man
to be “the devil himself,” and that Ali and his brother had both joined the “hate group.”
The article also remarked that Ali idolized Elijah Muhammad, who spent time in federal
prison during “World War I on charges of being a draft dodger.”37
The Tribune applied pressure in other areas as well. A reporter attended the
inaugural day of the Inland Daily Press Association meeting, where over twenty
publishers, editors, and other executives of Illinois newspapers commented on Ali’s
remarks. The Chicago Tribune claimed that all interviewees believed that “the image of
Chicago, the state, the nation, and the boxing profession will be irreparably damaged if
the fight is permitted to take place.” Robert Sward, business manager of the Moline
Dispatch, commented that “I would not miss Clay from the sports scene at all . . . because
of his unusual attitudes and habits.” This article illustrates the enemies that Muhammad
Ali faced in the domestic press—of the twenty owners of media outlets in the state of
Illinois not one supported Ali’s right to dissent, and all believed that Ali’s image
abstractly (and “irreparably”) damaged all that it touched. 38
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The Tribune also suggested that those supportive of Ali had ulterior motives,
some of them self-serving but others possibly criminal. One story speculated that the
Illinois Athlete Commission was reticent about canceling the fight because it needed
money. Of the $50,733.70 that the commission spent in 1965, the majority went to
salaries. But the commission only received $28,012 in event receipts that same year,
reported the Tribune, causing a financial crisis. The paper printed the salaries of all
commission members—two of whom returned the money because of the commission’s
financial straits—and then attempted to implicate the board members in questionable
situations. One member, the Tribune reported, had previously worked as a hostess at a
restaurant that arsonists burned, and the head of the commission Joe Triner had
apparently contradicted a decision he made in 1938 when he banned a Joe Louis bout
because of a pre-fight controversy.39
On 22 February, despite growing pressure from the Tribune and State politicians,
Joe Triner announced that the athletic commission would meet with Ali. According to
Triner, who had spoken to Ali on the telephone, the champ apologized to “the
commission, the governor, the fight promoters, and the public.” In his first comments
since the initial reaction to reclassification, Ali appeared contrite. Triner told the Tribune
that Ali “said that he was sorry for having his big mouth make those statements” and
would prove to the commission that he did not mean them. The Tribune also reported
that Ali was en route to Chicago to speak at the annual Nation of Islam convention,
where the boxer had apparently taken Malcolm X’s position as second in power only to
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Elijah Muhammad. Two “Letters to the Editor” asking for the commission to bar the
fight also appeared, as did an account of Governor Kerner’s orders to the board to
reconsider allowing the bout.40
Two editorials about Ali ran in the Tribune on 23 February 1966, the first
disingenuous, the second, sadistic. The first editorial praised Chicago mayor Richard
Daley for his “good judgment” in opposing the fight. “It is not in the interests of the
people of Chicago or Illinois to glorify men of the caliber of Terrell or Clay or to invite
the enormous danger of disorder which the fight will entail.” Despite assurances from
the police department that they could control the “Black Muslims,” the Tribune reminded
readers that “violence could spread like a prairie fire.” If this editorial suggested that Ali
was a truly dangerous individual that could physically injure the city of Chicago, the
second editorial characterized Ali as a spoiled, cowardly egomaniac. 41
The second editorial, penned by David Condon and addressed to “Mr. Greatest,”
made light of the dangers Ali would face in the Army. The article sarcastically claimed
that, although generals and colonels may not meet Ali’s personal qualifications for
friends, he would first encounter the drill instructor, who will deny that Ali is “the
greatest” at all. The article’s author delighted in the thought of Ali peeling potatoes,
mopping floors, and being mocked and ostracized by his fellow soldiers. The editorial
also suggested—with an attempt at humor--that Ali could be killed during live
ammunition training, but should not worry, as the second-lieutenant would notify his next
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of kin. If Ali survived, Condon concluded, he would feel patriotic every time he sees the
Stars and Stripes. “It’ll get even a big knothead like you.”42
On 25 February Ali arrived at the Chicago airport from Miami. As he stepped off
the plane, reporters noticed that his mouth was taped shut. After saying that he and
promoter Ben Bentley had thought of the tape together, he refused to answer any of the
journalists’ questions and instead climbed into a car driven by his manager Herbert
Muhammad. Ali controlled his own image through silence; in response the Tribune
listed, in numerical order, “the statements most inflammatory” made by Ali after he
learned of his reclassification. Ignoring its own actions of the past week, the paper
reported that Governor Kerner “brought about today’s showdown.” The paper then
suggested that the Governor stop the fight using a provision in the Illinois State athletic
code barring contestants guilty of “ungentlemanly conduct.” Another unsigned editorial
appeared that denounced Ali as a “crybaby” and, before the meeting even commenced,
predicted that the fight would be canceled. “Why not take the fight back to Louisville?”
the editorialist asked, where the 11 millionaires of Ali’s managerial group first “foisted
Clay onto the public” [.]43
Muhammad Ali’s meeting with the Illinois State Athletic Commission was the
climax of this fight for self-definition. With every reference to Cassius Clay, Ali
interrupted with “Muhammad Ali, if you please sir.” Ali, wearing a signature bow-tie,
expressed regret that he had threatened the investments of promoters, angered veterans,
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and embarrassed the commission.

When chairman Joe Triner “led with his chin” by

asking: “Then you’re not apologizing for the unpatriotic statements you made?” Ali
abandoned his prepared statements and replied, “I’m apologizing for making them to
sportswriters and newspapers.” Amid the nine television cameras set up to record the
exchange, Ali’s attorney attempted to intercede, but Ali brushed him off and, recognizing
the limited authority of the Commission, said “I’m not here to make a showdown plea or
apologize the way the press said I would . . . if I’ve got any apologizing to do, I’ll do it to
government officials . . . [but] I don’t have to apologize. I’m not in court.”
Commissioner Robichaux interjected with a central question of image, asking Ali if he
was behaving like the “people’s champion.” Ali yelled “Yes I am!” A shouting match
ensued, in the midst of which Commissioner Radzienda called a recess.44
Less than an hour after the recess, the Illinois Attorney General declared the
match illegal because of a legal technicality. But a letter to the editor published the day
after the commission meeting suggests that the fervor with which the Tribune attacked
the fight also angered the paper’s readership. Bowman Kreer pleaded with the paper,
“don’t write about him . . . [don’t] take his picture. Don’t even criticize him. Just
completely ignore him.” Kreer, who called the champ “Cassius Aly or Muhammad Clay
or whatever his name is,” denounced his Viet Nam comments. In an attempt to counter
the Tribune’s claim that as news, Ali must be covered Kreer wrote “I say he’s legitimate
news on the one or two nights a year that he defends his title. It would be better for the
country, especially its youngsters, if none of the things Clay says or stands for ever were
44
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printed.” Kreer, a Tribune reader concerned with the over-saturation of Ali in the
newspaper, essentially asked editors to stop Ali from promoting his own image. 45
____________________________________________
Was Ali really dangerous? The reasons that the New York State Athletic
Commission refused to license the Ali/ Terrell bout make the zeal of the Chicago Tribune
and the actions of the Illinois Attorney General against Muhammad Ali appear
completely misguided. New York refused the fight not because of the statements of Ali,
but because of the associations of Ernie Terrell. Terrell, aside from boxing
professionally, played guitar in a rhythm and blues band called “The Heavyweights.”
The booking agent for the band, Bernie Glickman, also managed Terrell’s boxing career,
albeit unofficially. The New York Athletic Commission required Terrell to swear in an
affidavit that he had broken all ties with Glickman, but, according to the Commission, the
same day that Terrell swore the affidavit he boarded an airplane for Chicago
accompanied by Glickman.46
Estes Kefauver’s Senate Subcommittee that investigated boxing had found that
Bernie Glickman was an associate of Frankie Carbo, who was once considered the
“underworld czar of boxing.” In 1966 Carbo, nicknamed “Mr. Gray,” was serving a
prison sentence for “extortion and conspiracy,” but the mention of his name in
association with Glickman and Terrell—coupled with the relationship between Carbo and
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the management of Madison Square Garden--was enough for the New York Athletic
Commission to deny Terrell a license for the Ali bout. Shortly after the failure to secure
the New York venue, Glickman claimed that Felix (Milwaukee Phil) Alderisio, a known
Mafia enforcer, attacked him in his suburban Schiller Park home. Alderisio choked
Glickman and threatened to kill both he and Terrell if the two did not stay apart.
Glickman, “reported to have been marked for death by underworld assassins,” claimed
that the attack was retribution for ruining the New York fight.47
In March 1966 Robert Lipsyte wrote a speculative column in the New York
Times suggesting that members of La Cosa Nostra crime syndicate could feel threatened
by the formation of Main Bout, Inc., Ali’s new promotional company. Formed in
January 1966, Main Bout, Inc. was an interracial management group whose members
included Ali’s manager—and son of Elijah Muhammad—Herbert Muhammad, and the
Cleveland Browns’ Jim Brown, among others. As the Courier Journal reported, while the
“glory is the champ’s, the power belongs to the man or corporation who controls the
promotional rights to championship matches,” as they decide everything, from where the
fight is shown and by whom to which vendors sell food at the bout itself. Eighty percent
of the revenue from the Ali/Terrell bout, which was set to broadcast in 300 cities in the
United States and Canada, would go to Ali and Main Bout, Inc, with the remaining
twenty percent being split between Terrell and the venue’s promoters.48
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Because Main Bout, Inc. had no Mafia ties, Lipsyte continued, then many of the
closed circuit operators, exhibitors, and other business associates that dealt with previous
heavyweight bouts could lose out on the profits of the fight. When New York backed out
on the fight, Chicago—“another city with a flourishing underworld”—licensed the fight.
Lipsyte reported that during the Tribune’s campaign against Ali, a rumor circulated
through the city that if Terrell could last 15 rounds, he could win the championship by
decision, even if he had not actually won the fight. Lipsyte argued that official fears of
violent disturbances after the fight supported this line of reasoning, especially if an unfair
anti-Ali decision caused a riot. But Chicago, too, passed on the fight.49
Throughout late February and early March, dozens of cities proposed holding the
fight, only to rescind their offers once politicians denounced Ali’s “unpatriotic
statements.” As the fight moved from city to city, over 100 of the 280 closed circuit
theaters broke their contracts and refused to carry the bout. Jim Brown held a highprofile meeting with New York Representative Adam Clayton Powell and claimed that
because Main Bout, Inc. was in control of the closed circuit coverage, efforts had been
made to “get rid of them.” Brown believed that these efforts were an attempt to stop a
black business from reaping most of the profits. Powell promised to investigate.50
When the city of Toronto agreed to host the fight, Ernie Terrell pulled out,
ostensibly because he disagreed with the contract. But Lipsyte suggested that Terrell
withdrew because, with the fight out of the country, his Mafia contacts could no longer
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control the outcome of the fight and would not make any money. Instead, he could wait
until Ali was forced into the Army or sent to prison, at which point Terrell would more
easily become the heavyweight boxing champion. George Chuvalo was named Terrell’s
replacement, but the fight seemed doomed to financial failure. Closed circuit theaters
canceled the fight in part due to pressure from politicians, the print media, and veteran’s
groups that disagreed with Ali, but there is a possibility that La Cosa Nostra played a role
in ruining the fight as well.51
Although Mafia figures often used violence and intimidation as a means to reach
desired goals, they, at times, also showed remarkable insight and creativity in using less
overt forms of pressure. Not unlike Muhammad Ali and the Chicago Tribune, Mafia
members also instigated image wars. A telling example of this occurred in Secaucus,
New Jersey, where a group of Cosa Nostra members had applied for a license to open a
racetrack. The Municipal Government refused to license these men because of their
underworld connections, but allowed another individual to obtain a license if a city
referendum proved that locals supported the track. In an attempt to defeat the vote, the
men who had been denied a license hired dozens of young black and Puerto Rican men to
distribute pamphlets for the racetrack.52
The pamphlets, which were delivered door to door in the white suburbs, claimed
that the racetrack was “pro-integration and pro-brotherhood.” The pamphleteers,
reported the New York Times, rang doorbells and “aggressively sought accommodation”
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in the homes of white New Jersey-ites. “They were actually out to wreak vengeance,”
commented a New York detective who confirmed that on the Saturday before the vote
eleven African American and Puerto Rican men were arrested for disorderly conduct.
The referendum, which carried the county and was heavily favored to win, was soundly
defeated in Secaucus and thus failed. The Mafia members had presented an aggressive
and negative image of integration, and the “white backlash” that the Cosa Nostra
members sought worked perfectly.53
Although scant evidence exists to prove that the Mafia exerted similar pressure to
damage the Ali/Chuvalo fight, there is little doubt that the crime syndicate remained a
strong force in boxing. In May 1966 authorities located Bernie Glickman in St. Louis,
where he was hiding from assassins, and returned him to Chicago with two FBI agents.
Glickman agreed to testify, and among those subpoenaed for the investigation were Harry
Markson and Teddy Brenner, who both worked as boxing officials at Madison Square
Garden. The investigation—which began as a result of Glickman’s claims—continued
throughout the 1970s, and uncovered Mafia involvement in boxing that reached as high
as Carlo Gambino, leader of the most powerful of the five families that constituted La
Cosa Nostra.54
Ernie Terrell was not alone in his association with Mafia figures. Frank DePaula,
a popular lightweight contender was arrested with his manager—a known associate of the
New York underworld--for stealing $80,000 dollars from a New Jersey pier.
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Heavyweight contender Jerry Quarry, later an opponent of Ali, worked with trainer
Teddy Bentham, who himself had trained a fighter named Tony Pellone. Tommy Eboli,
a childhood friend of Bentham’s, managed Pellone. In the mid 1950s, after Pellone was
defeated in a match, Tommy Eboli jumped into the ring and punched referee Ray Miller
in the mouth. In 1966, after the death of Vito Genovese, Eboli was expected to control
La Cosa Nostra. “I don’t like to talk much about Tommy,” Bentham said in an interview,
“because I might meet those guys on the street sometime.” In 1969 Eboli’s associate
James Napoli (Jimmy Nap), a professional gambler with connections to Teddy Brenner
of Madison Square Garden, was indicted by a federal boxing inquiry for fixing fights. In
1972, while walking on a Brooklyn sidewalk, Tommy Eboli was shot five times in the
face by a Cosa Nostra assassin and killed.55
So, considering La Cosa Nostra’s involvement with Terrell, a question arises:
who was more dangerous to boxing, Muhammad Ali or Ernie Terrell? During the
investigations into Glickman’s claims, a prosecutor commented to the New York Times
that news coverage and media speculation had damaged the government’s inquiry into
Mafia control of boxing. As the investigation progressed, prosecutors echoed this
statement. New York District Attorney Alfred Scotti refused to discuss any details of the
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case with the media, and the head of New York State’s Boxing Commission, Edwin
Dooley, also refused to comment about details of the case.56
But officials seldom protested media coverage of Muhammad Ali, and in the days
following Ali’s reclassification statements it was Ali—not Terrell—who was considered
more dangerous to the public. Charles Siragusa, the executive director for the Illinois
Criminal Investigation commission appeared to sum up the feelings of the Tribune when
he stated that, although New York had refused the fight because of Terrell’s ties to
Glickman, what really disgusted him was Ali’s “whining appeal to avoid military
service.” Surely a fixed championship fight, promoted by racketeers and professional
gamblers and supported by Mafia enforcers, would do far more to discredit the city of
Chicago and the sport of boxing in general than would the presence of Muhammad Ali,
who belonged to a religious minority and was managed by a company whose board was
made up of a black majority. But the Chicago Tribune’s image of Ali would have been
contradicted by such disclosures.
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The preceding paragraphs illuminate two important points. The first point is that
the Chicago Tribune’s campaign to drive the Muhammad Ali/Ernie Terrell bout out of
Chicago was more than misdirected, it was unfair. Although the campaign illustrates the
esteem in which Ali and the Nation of Islam were held in the newspaper’s mind, it also
shows a willful distortion of fact and circumstance. The newspaper attacked Ali
incessantly for days, until pressure from the paper and the state government cancelled the

56

Ibid 2 April 1966 “News Media”

57

Chicago Tribune 23 February 1966 “Siragusa Raps Clay On Draft”

44

fight. In the entire week of coverage, Ernie Terrell’s ties with Glickman were mentioned
exactly once, and even in that story important details—especially concerning death
threats and the possibility of a fixed fight—were noticeably absent.
Aside from investigating Mafia ties in boxing as a comparative tool, the above
paragraphs also serve to illustrate the variety of forces arrayed against Muhammad Ali.
Ali’s detractors—veteran’s groups, politicians, and aggressive journalists (Lipsyte even
speculates that the Louisville Sponsoring Group, which had managed Ali since his
Olympic victory and who were being replaced by Herbert Muhammad and the nation,
were attempting to discredit him)—were joined, unwittingly, by the likes of “Milwaukee
Phil”, “Mr. Gray”, and Carlo Gambino. Ali’s defeat of Sonny Liston in 1964 had
essentially eliminated Mafia ties to the heavyweight crown. Liston was well known for
his associations with the Cosa Nostra—had even acted as an enforcer and bodyguard for
some members—and his loss to the then Cassius Clay left the associations between the
Mafia and heavyweight boxing obsolete. The Mafia did not control Ali, who instead
formed Main Bout, Inc. to generate revenue for the Nation of Islam as well as to aid the
black community in general.58
____________________________________________
“What did I do wrong?” Muhammad Ali asked a Courier Journal reporter.
“What did I do to become the most despised athlete in history?” The heavyweight
champion, in Toronto training for the bout against Terrell’s replacement George Chuvalo,
listed the reasons that he should be popular. “I live a good life, I don’t run around with
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women—and you just don’t know how many there are hanging around a champion.” As
well as abstaining from drinking and smoking, Ali remarked that “I take care of my
parents. They’re good Christian and humble people . . . And I’m religious. I pray five
times a day and go to worship three nights a week. But then I say I don’t have any
quarrel with the Viet Cong, and everybody gets on me . . . I didn’t expect Southerners to
like me. I’m a Negro that’s got money. But what about the rest of them? What did I do
except say what I thought? I thought any American was supposed to be able to do that.”59
Ali was not referring only to the domestic press. Joe Louis criticized “Cassius
Clay”, as did Floyd Patterson, for his comments. Jackie Robinson, while offering support
to Ali as an athlete, remarked that, on the subject of Vietnam, the boxer was “on his
own.” While some in his peer group enlisted for service—including Arthur Ashe,
previously a member of ROTC—others, while not making overtly political statements,
openly met with Ali. Jim Brown, Bill Russell, and (the then) Lou Alcindor all discussed
the issue with Ali privately, and offered their “support in whatever he chose to do.” The
reaction in the broader African-American was similarly mixed. Young northerners
tended to support Ali, while the older and more conservative middle-class, both North
and South, did not. A New York Times reporter, in an attempt to gauge black public
opinion, interviewed several middle-aged men in a Harlem barbershop. All of the men
referred to Ali as “Cassius Clay,” and, refraining from openly criticizing the boxer,
suggested that he was being manipulated by the Nation of Islam. While moderates often
disguised their dubious reactions to Ali’s associations and statements by questioning his

59

Courier Journal 17 March 1966 James S. Tunnell “Champ Wonders What Went Wrong” p 1

46

overall state of mind, conservatives railed against him. “I see no reason why the law
shouldn’t be broken in the cases of Cleveland Sellers, Stokely Carmichael, and Cassius
Clay,” began a letter written to the Atlanta Constitution, and attributed only to “A
NEGRO VIETNAM DISABLED VETERAN” The author suggested that all three
should be jailed immediately, and that Carmichael should be “beheaded.”60
After scores of United States cities refused to hold the fight—prompting the
champ at one point to forge a passport to the moon, the only place left to fight--Ali found
himself in Canada, where he began a campaign to rally support and answer his critics.
According to Al Sokol of the Toronto Telegram, Canada felt a “dubious reaction . . . to
the war in Viet Nam,” and both the press and the public warmly welcomed the
controversial boxer. He joked about being “a champion against the world,” but as the
aftermath of the Chuvalo match would show, the comment was not entirely correct. In
response to the prospective failure of the fight, especially in the closed circuit market, Ali
replied with an image of principled defiance. “I know I’m losing a lot of money and I
don’t care because I’m proving a point.” Most importantly, Ali endeared himself to the
Canadians. “Clay has made a wonderful impression,” Al Sokol stated, and Tom
Geargevich, Toronto resident, added: “He’s a wonderful young man . . . we are glad he is
here.”61
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On 28 March 1966, two days before the fight, Ali, who had been shadow boxing
before a crowd of hundreds of fans, leaned on the top rope and shouted: “All you sports
writers—c’mon into the ring. I got a surprise for you.” Larry Boeck, writing for the
Louisville Courier-Journal, reported that in the suddenly silent gymnasium not a sports
writer moved. “C’mon now . . . I give you all interviews all the time.” The request was
again met with silent stillness. “You don’t come in no ring and I don’t give you no more
interviews.” The threat compelled the self-conscious journalists to climb into the boxing
ring. “This is where I’ve always wanted to get you guys—in the ring with me.”62
One onlooker suggested that Ali start throwing punches, but he refused. Ali then
asked how many reporters were from the United States, but before they could reply the
champ began counting them off. “Ladies and gentleman, these are the men who run me
out of the United States.” He then turned to the crowd of hundreds who were watching
him train. “But wherever I go, that’s where the title goes. So you tell ‘em who’s the
champion of the world?” The crowd roared back “You are!” “Who’s the champ of
Canada?” “You are!” they screamed. “Who’s the champ of Trinidad?” he asked, before
answering his own question with “I am!”63
The fight turned out to be far more of a contest than experts expected. This
resulted, to a great extent, from Chuvalo’s toughness. Chuvalo had never been knocked
down in a fight, much less knocked out, and one observer noted that if all fights went 100
rounds Chuvalo would be the heavyweight champion. The 13,000 spectators at Maple
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Leaf Gardens witnessed “more action and punishment than any other crowd at a
Clay fight.” At one point Ali, holding Chuvalo’s head, allowed the challenger to rabbit
punch his lower side. “Harder! Harder!” Ali yelled, stirring up the crowd. Despite a
tough fight, Chuvalo lost in a fifteen round decision and Ali remained the champion of
heavyweight boxing.64
But Ali had enjoyed a victory before he ever set foot inside the ring—he had
wooed an international constituency. The story above illustrates Ali’s response to the
press; he negated the power of media outlets opposed to him by demonstrating his
international popularity. Ali recognized that the media’s image of him had contributed to
the failure of securing a U.S. venue for the fight, but he countered the actions of domestic
opponents by traveling abroad and generating international support. In this capacity, Ali
benefited from the rise of global communications technology. Ali’s popularity abroad
had grown steadily since his conversion to Islam and his world tour following his victory
over Sonny Liston, but in the years since that tour technological advances had made
possible the live broadcast of events across the globe. If Ali refined his image for
international consumption, that image was projected internationally. Ali’s actions in
Canada, however, were only the beginning.
The day after his loss to Ali, George Chuvalo, along with his wife and a cousin,
were sitting outside of their hotel in Toronto when they saw an object in the sky. Lynne
Chuvalo told a reporter that the object was “unlike any commercial aircraft I’ve ever
seen.” The object, glowing white, red, green, and blue, was witnessed by hundreds of
64
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other Canadians as well. The day before the fight, scores of people across the United
States and Canada reported seeing unidentified flying objects. Ali himself spoke of
spaceships three days before the fight. The “mothership,” as Ali called it, was one-half a
mile long and one-half a mile wide, and could be seen on clear nights. According to
Nation of Islam doctrine, the ship was piloted by Allah himself, who would land the craft
and rescue all Muslims when the Earth was destroyed in the wars of Armageddon. More
U.F.O.’s were sighted in 1966 than in any other year that such sightings were recorded.
The phenomenon was so widespread internationally that Soviet scientists proposed an
international investigation, and many reporters joked about a “flying saucer gap.”65
Objects were orbiting the heavens. In 1939 Wernher von Braun, a German
scientist, inspired by the technological advances made by Robert H. Goddard, developed
the first guidance controlled vertical rocket that, on its’ test run, reached an altitude of
over seven miles. Slightly modified versions of this rocket—known as V2s—were fired
on London during World War II. Following the war, British science fiction writer Arthur
C. Clarke proposed that, using the rocket technology to break the bonds of gravity,
satellites could be installed in space that would vastly improve communications. Clarke
suggested that signals could be beamed from Earth to the satellites, which could then
transmit them back to other points on the planet. In 1957 the Soviet Union launched the
first satellite, a 194 pound yellow ball called Sputnik, or “fellow traveler.” American
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newspapers carried banner headlines that claimed “America Beaten” and “Pearl Harbor
in Space.” Two years later Muhammad Ali won his first championship fight--a gold
medal at the 1960 Rome Olympics.66
On 10 July 1962 AT&T launched Telstar I, the first satellite to send television
signals across the Atlantic Ocean. The launch, a cultural event, was immortalized in a
song by the Tornadoes. Suspicious of private control of telecommunications, and
prescient in his skepticism that private ownership of satellites could lead to conflicts of
interest between business and government, President John F. Kennedy refused to take
part in the launch or in the inaugural telecasts of the Telstar. Kennedy believed that the
federal government should have oversight over international communications, and in
1963 COMSAT was created to regulate transmissions between the United States and
foreign governments. One year later Muhammad Ali defeated Sonny Liston to capture
the heavyweight boxing crown.67
Muhammad Ali’s success continued to parallel triumphs in communication
technology. The first commercial international communications satellite, and the first
step towards an international satellite system, was named Early Bird, later changed to
Intelsat 1. Early Bird connected the United States and Europe, and was launched in June
1965. That same year Muhammad Ali defeated Sonny Liston in a rematch to secure his
position as heavyweight champion. Intelsat 2, also known as Lani, or Heavenly, Bird,
connected the U.S. and Hawaii in November 1966, but when it failed to reach its exact
66
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orbit, a second Lani Bird was launched to connect the U.S. with Japan, Thailand, the
Philippines, and Australia. Muhammad Ali’s fight against Ernie Terrell for the WBA
championship belt occurred three months later. These were soon supplemented by other
satellites, and by 1968 communication satellites connected the entire world.68
Muhammad Ali’s international popularity was inextricable from the
technological advances that facilitated global viewership. In London awaiting his August
1966 bout against Brian London, Ali told a reporter that because of him eight countries—
the holy city of Mecca, Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria, Turkey, Algeria, and Sudan-would see a boxing match for the first time. He continued that over 600 million people
would watch him, from “old ladies to itty-bitty children. I’ll reach into every culture,
every nation, every religion.” His 1967 bout against Ernie Terrell was listed for both the
Early Bird and the Lani Bird satellites, and was broadcast simultaneously through Europe
and Asia—a first in the history of communications. Reporters from the British
Broadcasting Company and Spanish networks, as well as the Nippon Television Network
in Japan provided audio commentary at ringside. The fight was broadcast to Australia,
Curacao, Ghana, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya, Kuwait, Liberia, Malaysia, Mauritius,
New Zealand, Nigeria, the Philippines, Rhodesia, Singapore, Surinam, Uganda,
Venezuela, Ecuador, Costa Rica, Uruguay, Argentina, and Puerto Rico, and was free on
home television screens internationally. The United States and Canada received closed
circuit coverage handled by Main Bout, Inc.69
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But international interest in his boxing matches, and the subsequent demand for
coverage, was inextricable from his personal appeal and, to a great extent, his image as a
principled dissenter. After news spread that Ali had been reclassified, he received letters
of support from fans in Algeria, Indonesia, and dozens of other countries. Ali had wooed
the Canadians, and during the buildup to the Chuvalo fight a corps of international
journalists interviewed the champ. A Dutch reporter had remarked “Americans are
envious because [Ali] speaks the truth,” and when Ali had asked two Turkish reporters if
he was known in their country, they replied, “You are beloved. On the streets of Istanbul
children wear pictures of you on their shirts and cry ‘I am the greatest!’” An English
expatriate in Egypt had declared that Ali was the reincarnation of Ramses II, “an old
show off, but [with] a certain amount of charm.” Following his victory over Chuvalo in
Toronto, Ali signed to fight Henry Cooper, the British contender, in London.70
The result, as one reporter remarked, was “the public relations coup of the year.”
In a press conference at the airport in London immediately after his arrival, Ali praised
his opponent, who was clearly outmatched, and began the campaign to win over the
English. British boxing had been something of a joke for the past 68 years, Robert
Lipsyte reminded readers, and that simple act of respect toward the British contender
“capture[d] the island without a blow.” He also wooed the international press by telling
Swedish reporters of his love for Stockholm, suggested to German reporters that German
contender Karl Mildenberger would be a tough opponent, and then shouted “Do they still
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know me in Ghana?” Invitations from Africa, Asia, and the Indian subcontinent arrived
daily, and Ali spoke of “truly exercising the world championship,” by traveling from
“country to country so everyone can have a shot.”71
He praised the American public, saying that the majority supported his decision,
and “It’s just some politicians and boxing commissioners who make certain moves.”
But, when asked about the United States press, Ali responded “The American press keeps
me in shape. The world wants to know, how can this man continue against the
propaganda machines of the most powerfullest Government in the world; how can this
man continue when even governments fall under the press?” Lipsyte reported that blacks
and Muslims in London considered Ali as one who “speaks for us,” and women had
praised his courage in standing up for his principles in the face of such strong opposition.
“As never before,” the reporter continued, “Ali feels like an international figure.” His
devotion to Allah connected him to the “vast Muslim brotherhood,” and his skin color
made him a symbol of “the black emergence.”72
The fight was bloody but relatively uneventful. Cooper was unusually prone to
cuts, and started bleeding from the face early in the fight. Ali seemed unwilling to
seriously injure the British challenger, especially as his face grew bloodier and bloodier.
The fight, transmitted to the United States through the Early Bird satellite, was available
free on home television, to be followed by the Preakness Stakes. Ali won easily, and in
the post-fight wrap up declared that “Islam gave me strength to defeat Cooper.” If Ali
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had experienced a warm reception in London 1966, mobbed by fans wherever he went
and treated with respect by the British press, it was but a hint at what was to follow.73
After the Cooper fight, Ali flew to Cairo, where he was greeted at the airport by a
crowd of five-hundred students chanting his name. He told the students that “Right now
my main concern is to go back to the States and try to beat the draft,” but, as a United
States citizen, he intended to “respect the laws of my country.” Later in the day, Ali met
President Gamal Abdel Nasser, who presented him with an ancient book of chantings
from the Koran. In the United Arab Emirates, the High Council for Islamic Affairs
hailed Ali as “A Moslem hero.” And the older brother of King Faisal gave Ali a ring that
had been in the family for generations. Even his detractor Arthur Daley was forced to
admit that Ali was the most popular champ ever.74
By January 1967, with his draft call imminent, Muhammad Ali was in Houston
where he was scheduled to fight none other than Ernie Terrell. The fight took on an
ominous tone when, during a pre-fight publicity meeting with reporters, Terrell
offhandedly called Ali “Clay.” The champ responded, “Why do you call me Clay? You
know my right name is Muhammad Ali.” Terrell, believing that Ali was trying to psyche
him out, did not respond. “It takes an Uncle Tom Negro to keep calling me by my slave
name . . . You acting like another Uncle Tom Floyd Patterson, and I’m going to give you
a good punishment, too. I’m going to make you an example to the world.” Patterson had
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attacked Ali for his affiliation with the Nation of Islam, and in Alex Haley’s 1964
interview with the then Cassius X, Ali had said that if he were to fight Patterson, it would
“be the first time I ever trained in myself to develop a brutal killer instinct.” Ali had
indeed met Patterson in a bout a year later, and made good on his promise to embarrass
the aging heavyweight. But at the weigh-in in Houston, Ali smacked Terrell, before
saying “I’ll ask you right after I whip you . . . if you don’t make it easy on yourself,
you’re gonna be in boss trouble.”75
The resulting fight was brutal. In the second round Ali broke Terrell’s
cheekbone, and a muscle in Terrell’s left eye hooked on the shattered bone, causing the
fighter to see double. By the fourth round, Terrell was incapacitated with his left eye
completely closed and by the seventh round blood poured from a cut above his right eye.
In the eighth round, Ali began screaming “What’s my name? What’s my name?”
accentuating each question with a punch to the broken cheek. By the ninth round, with
Terrell huddled in a defensive posture, Ali smiled at the crowd and boasted “You can’t
hit me. But I can hit you.” Most sportswriters agreed that Ali had deliberately avoided
knocking Terrell out in an effort to prolong the humiliation. Ali easily won the 15-round
decision. “I’m like an astronaut,” Ali told reporters after the fight. “In a world of my
own.” As Ali boasted to reporters that he had embarrassed the “dog”, Terrell underwent
surgery to repair his left eye.76
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The Muhammad Ali/ Ernie Terrell fight was, in many respects, the climax of
events that had occurred since Ali’s reclassification--if not since his conversion to Islam.
If Terrell was indeed the “great white hope” of many Americans--the symbol of an
accommodationist African American who could reclaim the championship from the
hands of Ali and the “Black Muslims”--he was also quite possibly, as the New York State
Athletic Commission believed, the last hope of the criminal underworld to reclaim
control of the heavyweight crown, a control that La Cosa Nostra lost when Ali defeated
Sonny Liston in 1964 and 1965. Terrell had held the World Boxing Association’s
heavyweight title going into the fight, and although that title was seldom recognized or
respected, Ali had unified the heavyweight belts and driven La Cosa Nostra from the
realm of boxing.
But the fight was also far more than an act that “cleaned up” boxing. It also
exposed a glaring contradiction in the way that the fight was recorded by the print media.
“One almost misses Frankie Carbo and his mobster ilk,” wrote sportswriter Arthur Daley
in response to Ali’s annihilation of Ernie Terrell. Why? Because as a first in the history
of communication, more people around the globe had witnessed the fight than any
previous boxing match. Millions of viewers had seen Ali demand recognition from
Terrell, and they had seen Ali brutalize the man for his refusal to comply. With the
defeat of Terrell, Ali proved internationally that he was unmatched in the sport of
boxing—unbeatable—and that his worldwide fame would only continue to grow. As a
black man, and, perhaps more importantly to his worldwide audience, a Muslim, Ali was
celebrated internationally at a crucial early stage of globalization. As the United States
and the Soviet Union competed to win the support of African and Asian nations in the
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Cold War, the first accessible (through television) international sports superstar was also
a separatist who called for an independent black nation. Highly critical of United States
foreign policy, Muhammad Ali toured the world, winning support from admirers
worldwide, and antagonizing the domestic daily press.77
Muhammad Ali highlighted the contradictions of the American press before an
international audience, the most glaring of which was the newspapers’ refusal to use the
name Muhammad Ali. In the mediated reality presented by the dailies, “Cassius Clay”
was a bad guy, and dangerous; a spoiled, suggestible crybaby who turned his back on a
country that provided him with everything. Ali rejected this reality. He responded to
labels of “dangerous” by accentuating his own humble religiosity while repeatedly
reminding reporters of his true name. He refused to concede to the categories of the
Chicago Tribune and the Illinois State Athletic Commission on topics as abstract as “The
People’s Champ.” His answer to the domestic press’s subjective concepts of meaning
and consequence was an unmatched physicality—the objective truth of contest in a
highly controlled environment—and a string of undeniable victories. In Canada he
countered the power of the United States press by drumming up international support.
Ali’s own version of events echoed internationally, illustrated by the
unprecedented amount of support from Africa, the Middle East, Europe, and Canada.
This support ensured that Ali’s bouts would continue to enjoy international satellite
coverage, which would, in turn, generate continued interest in Ali’s legal situation. He
could be “a Muslim hero” in Egypt, “the greatest” in Turkey, a voice of truth in Holland,
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a fine, respectable man in Canada and England, and, alternately an “unpatriotic crybaby”
and a dangerous voice of dissent in the United States. But, as Chapter Two will show,
agents of the state and members of the general public agreed with the mediated reality
presented by the domestic press.
The character of “Cassius Clay”, as depicted by American dailies, was guilty of
draft evasion and cowardice, made clear by his initial statements about reclassification
and buttressed by the claims of sports writers, newspaper editors, and political
appointees. In this mediated reality, “Cassius Clay” could not be found innocent, could
not even be defended, and (as far as the daily papers were concerned) the debate ended
there. “Clay” had convicted himself from the very beginning, before he even formally
refused induction. When “Cassius Clay” finally refused to take the symbolic step
forward, agents of the government reacted to him as the newspapers had predicted they
would (and should): with swift, silencing action.
But state authorities were not dealing with the “Cassius Clay” of the press.
(Muhammad Ali was far more complex--more radical, conservative, and liberal--than
editorialists suggested, as was clearly evident in the papers’ own day-to-day coverage.)
Nor were they facing a Civil Rights movement based on non-violence. During the next
two years, frustrations over seemingly slow civil rights achievements gave rise to an
increasingly aggressive—and armed—black militancy, concentrated in urban settings
previously untouched by Civil Rights groups. Black militancy coincided with the
domestic anti-war movement, arguably still in its’ nascent stages in 1966, which grew
exponentially in the ensuing years, garnering national attention for acts of civil
disobedience and protest. Muhammad Ali was neither an armed black militant, nor was
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he was member of an anti-war group--unless Catholics qualify as an anti-war group;
members of the Nation of Islam fought in Vietnam—but both the domestic press and
various state authorities treated him as such. These comparisons, while initially
detrimental, eventually served to vindicate Ali. This is the focus of the next chapter.
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Chapter Two: “’How Can You Call It Freedom?’ Muhammad
Ali, Revolution, and the State, 1967-1971”

On 28 April 1966 Muhammad Ali ate breakfast in the restaurant of the Hotel
America in Houston. Staring out the window at the overcast morning, Ali said “Every
time I fight it gets cold and rainy. Then dingy and cool, no sun in sight nowhere.” At 8
A.M., Ali stepped out of a taxicab with his legal team—Hayden Covington, Quinnan
Hodges, and Chauncey Eskridge, lawyer for Martin Luther King, Jr.—and quickly
walked up the stairs outside of the United States Custom House on Jacinto Street. A
group of black men on their way to work stood across the street and applauded Ali’s
courage, saying “he gets more publicity than [President] Johnson.” Scores of television
and newspaper reporters stood as Muhammad Ali disappeared inside of the imposing
structure to fill out paperwork, give a blood test, and be apprised of the upcoming
induction schedule.” At lunch, Ali refused the ham sandwich that was provided to all
recruits.78
Outside of the Custom House, television crews attempted to instigate a small
demonstration. A group of white college students had driven from Oklahoma to show
support for Ali and opposition to the war in Vietnam, and a half-dozen young black men
wearing “Black Power buttons” appeared on the street as well. The television news
78
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teams, through aggressive and “sometimes insulting” questions eventually led both
groups to create signs. The white college students created signs that called for the end of
the war and improved civil rights. The African American group, eventually growing to
about two dozen, held signs that read “Burn Baby Burn” and “Nothing Kills A Nigger
Like Too Much Love”. The reporters convinced several of the black protestors to wrap
bed sheets around their heads or bodies in imitation of west African garb, and most of the
group, reported Robert Lipsyte, were young women on their lunch hour from nearby
businesses.79
At 1:10 P.M. Lieutenant Colonel J. Edwin McKee appeared at an improvised
press room in the Custom House and declared to reporters: “Mr. Muhammad Ali has just
refused to be inducted.” Ali was not arrested, McKee continued, but notice had been sent
to the United States Attorney General. Then Ali appeared in the room, and before
thirteen television cameras and scores of reporters, quietly handed out a printed
statement. Ali refused to answer reporter’s questions, but the statement thanked those
who had helped him in his professional career, Elijah Muhammad, Muhammad Oweida,
the Secretary General of the High Council for Islamic Affairs, and Floyd McKissick, the
president of the Congress of Racial Equality. “It is in light of my consciousness as a
Muslim minister and my own personal convictions that I take my stand in refusing the
call to be inducted in the armed services,” the statement began. “I strongly object to the
fact that so many newspapers have given the American public and the world the
79
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impression that I have only two alternatives in taking this stand: either I go to jail or I go
to the army. There is another alternative and that alternative is justice.”80
The account above illustrates several key themes for this chapter. The
demonstration of support for Ali, although initially small and quiet, grew, with the
involvement of the television news crews, into a symbol of black defiance against an
oppressive state. This was not the initial goal of the protestors—although they played a
role in creating signs and acquiescing to reporters’ requests—but was assigned to them
based on the imperatives of the news organizations present. The display was constructed
to convey a message from white television producers to the viewing public at large—the
event was created by the media with the cooperation of the individual actors involved.
Ali’s appearance at the improvised press room mirrored his actions at the Chicago airport
where his mouth was taped shut. At a crucial and controversial moment Ali controlled
his mediated image by remaining silent. This silence contrasts sharply with the
violence—rhetorical and physical—of the Ernie Terrell fight in Houston, where another
image of Ali was evident. Finally, by rejecting the binary opposites of “prison” or
“Army” (through the identification of a third category, that of justice) Ali contributed to
setting the terms of debate within the public consciousness.
Ali had highlighted a contradiction in the mediated reality presented by the press
and confirmed by the state, and he exploited similar gaps to his own benefit. This
chapter begins with the legal appeals that attempted to halt the induction process, appeals
that centered on selecting between Ali’s several public personas. This process was not
80
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entirely controlled by Ali, however, as politicians and the general public contributed to
Ali’s image construction. While Ali refined one image on the college lecture circuit,
officials in the government and print media presented another image, connecting the
boxer to violent strands of dissent emerging within the United States. To his opponents,
Ali personified the potential of a violent domestic revolution against the socio-political
order, and officials met the threat posed by Ali as they did the dangers posed by
suspected revolutionaries—with quick actions of questionable legality. As the possibility
of revolution grew more immediate--spurred on by organizations like the Revolutionary
Action Movement, groups within the white New Left, and institutions like the Chicago
Police and National Guard—Ali presented an image of moderation Ali’s return to the
ring—and the magnanimous image that he presented in Atlanta—illustrates this shift.
If the threat that Ali posed to the social order seemed tempered, especially after
the highly symbolic bout against Joe Frazier, the boxer remained a powerful figure of
draft resistance and opposition to the war in Vietnam. While some individuals focused
on specific images of Ali—that of black power ideologue or anti-war protestor—to
justify denying Ali the ability to box or travel abroad, Ali and his legal team activated
other images—religious dissenter or oppressed minority—to combat such attempts. If
Ali was attacked for certain images, he was exonerated for others. Ali won this battle, in
effect, because the United States Supreme Court rejected the opposition’s image of the
boxer and accepted Ali’s own definition of himself.
Since the first news of draft eligibility, Ali’s lawyers had attempted to stop the
confrontation at Jacinto Street. Among Ali’s first remarks on 18 February 1966 were
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assurances that his reclassification would be appealed. The grounds for appeal were
based on activating two of Ali’s “images”—that of unruly and unintelligent reactionary
or that of religious dissenter. Ali initially claimed conscientious objector status. Four
days later, Ali’s personal lawyer Edward Jacko told reporters that the appeal would be
based on the previous induction tests claiming that Ali was “psychologically
untrainable.” These pending appeals delayed Ali’s induction date, as an individual could
not be drafted while courts considered appeals. On 18 March Ali appeared in Louisville,
Kentucky to appeal his reclassification personally; he argued to the board that his religion
forbade him from taking part in Vietnam. The board denied his request to change the
status, but it did allow Ali to leave the country to fight George Chuvalo in Canada. 81
After the Louisville draft board refused to reclassify him, Ali had few options. If
on the second appeal the board unanimously voted that he should be drafted, Ali would
have to submit to induction. Any disagreement between the board left Ali with another
chance of appeal. After his victory against Chuvalo, Ali fought in London before
embarking on a world tour. Although this tour allowed Ali to mobilize international
support through his roles as athlete, political figure, and religious hero, it also delayed the
draft board’s ability to induct him. A registrant, Ali’s lawyer Edward Jacko told a
81
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reporter, had a 60-day extension to appeal draft board action if the individual had been
out of the country. Following the world tour, Ali returned to London in August to fight
Brian London, again delaying his deadline for appeal. 82
If Ali was fighting abroad as a result of political pressure at home and unmatched
support internationally, he also fought abroad to allow his appeals to stall the induction
process. Despite these attempts, the draft process continued and Ali’s legal defense
struggled. In response, lawyers activated another image—that of an oppressed minority
involved in the larger Civil Rights struggle. On 17 March 1967 Ali’s lawyers filed suit in
Owensboro, Kentucky alleging that the Louisville draft board was “illegally constituted”
of all whites, a situation that Hayden Covington claimed should void Ali’s induction.
When this suit failed, Covington appealed to the Sixth District Court in Cincinnati and
also requested a restraining order to stop Ali’s induction. The Justice Department wrote
a letter to the presiding judge, reminding him that the Supreme Court had “uniformly
held that Selective Service registrants may not challenge draft board action . . . except by
submitting to induction and seeking relief by habeas corpus, or by refusing to submit and
raising their contentions in defense to a criminal prosecution.”83
In late March 1967 Ali swore an affidavit that his legal residence was Houston
Texas. This act, called a “delaying tactic” by the director of the Louisville draft board,
required that Ali’s records be transferred to Texas, forcing the Houston draft Board to
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manage his induction. The Houston draft board had filled its induction order for April;
Ali would not be drafted until at least June. A U.S. District Court in Louisville held a
hearing investigating Ali’s claims that the Kentucky draft board was “illegally
constituted”; at the same time the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals was still considering his
appeal. Both courts found against Ali, and on 24 April 1967 the United States Supreme
Court refused to hear his appeal that the “induction order was unconstitutional.” The day
after the High court’s refusal, Covington informed a Houston court that Ali would never
submit to induction—a position that contradicted earlier claims that the boxer was
considering joining the Army—and requested that the court stay his induction and hold a
hearing to determine if Ali was a conscientious objector. Covington also called for Texas
draft boards to immediately appoint African American members. All requests were
denied.84
Ali’s refusal to step forward—as his remarks following reclassification had a year
and half earlier—generated strong criticism and political pressure. After Ali’s comments
in February 1966, the white American public seemed squarely against the boxer.
Veterans groups passed resolutions denouncing the fighter, and letters to the editor of
newspapers criticized the champ. In Ali’s hometown of Louisville, Mrs. L. F. Lauer
suggested to the Courier Journal that Ali be sent to Vietnam without a gun. Other writers
claimed that Ali should be punished for highly abstract offenses. M. R. Constanzo
argued that Ali’s refusal to serve was a “sign of rot in our own United States.” W. L.
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Collins, Sr. wrote that Ali had “talked his way out of the hearts of all Americans” and
that “the yellow streak in his remarks should not be put on exhibition.” And Charles
Peace commented that “King Kong could play the role of man or champion better than he
and do it with more grace . . . Does he really believe that he is beautiful? If so . . . we
should feel pity.” Other newspaper readers connected Muhammad Ali with the Civil
Rights Movement. J. Earle Mason of Kentucky, while supporting the right of dissent,
wrote that “. . . in other words, send Julian Bond back to the Georgia Legislature and
send Cassius into the Army. He needs it.” “Until recently,” wrote Bill Hays, Jr. to the
Courier Journal “Martin Luther King, Jr. and Cassius Clay helped to win their people
rights . . . [but] it’s hard to understand two men . . . who want help from the white race
but do not want the black race to help the yellow race.” 85
Public response from veteran’s groups and private citizens provoked politicians to
action. Less than a week after Ali’s February remarks, the Kentucky State Senate passed
a resolution imploring Ali to “switch and fight.” “The sudden aversion to fighting on the
part of Cassius M. Clay brings discredit to all loyal Kentuckians,” the resolution started
before claiming that the memory of Cassius Clay, the abolitionist for whom Ali was
named “is particularly slurred by his ignoble efforts to avoid being drafted.” From this
perspective, Ali had abstractly injured an entire state and had embarrassed a dead man
whose name the champ had rejected two years earlier. After hearing of Ali’s plan to buy
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a farm in Tuskegee, the Alabama House of Representatives passed a resolution stating
that “He will not be welcomed by the people of any race.” Ali moved there anyway.
Illinois State Legislators denounced Ali, and pressure from Governor Otto Kerner,
coupled with the campaign of the Chicago Tribune, drove the Ali/Terrell fight out of the
city. With the fight homeless, politicians across the United States used the situation to
their advantage; cities offered to hold the fight, and politicians then promised to protect
their citizens from such a display. 86
After the California State Athletic Commission agreed to license Ali to fight,
then-Governor Ronald Reagan said “That draft dodger will never fight in my state,
period.” Ali’s hometown of Louisville offered the fight until Kentucky Governor
Breathitt refused, and similar offers were made by cities in Maine, as well as Pittsburgh,
Miami, Huron, South Dakota, Boston, Las Vegas, and Brownwood, Texas. When
Manchester and Portsmouth in New Hampshire were named as possibilities, Governor
John King told a reporter “never.” The fight also struggled to find a venue in Canada,
with Montreal, Verdun, Sorel, and Edmonton mentioned before Toronto accepted. Even
after the Ali/ Chuvalo match was set in Toronto, politicians continued to oppose the fight.
Closed circuit coverage of Ali/ Chuvalo was banned in Miami, Boston and San
Antonio.87
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Politicians also pressured Athletic Commissions, who in turn pressured promoters
and exhibitors. In Boston, boxing promoter Sam Silverman had rented the Boston Arena
to show the Ali/ Chuvalo match. Edward Urbec, the head of the Massachusetts State
Athletic Commission, asked that Silverman not show the fight, and Silverman agreed,
apparently to avoid future conflict with the Commission. But Boston’s Mayor made the
announcement that the fight was banned, illustrating the collusion and political power
that politicians had over athletic commissions and sports promoters. The actions of the
commissions in refusing Muhammad Ali and Ernie Terrell hint at the political pressure
levied against the state boards. Ali’s anti-war remarks and Ernie Terrell’s mafia ties
were enough to chase the fight out of the country. But no laws had been broken, so
politicians had no more recourse than to refuse to license the fight. 88
In early June 1966, three months after the fight was cancelled, the governor of
New York appointed Edwin Dooley, a former college football player, to the head of the
New York State Athletic Commission. In an interview announcing the decision, Dooley
spoke of international interest in boxing as a result of Muhammad Ali before accusing
Ali of abstractly hurting an entire sport. He admitted that Ali was the “most seen fighter
ever”, but claimed that “It’s a pity that Clay has loused up his image and the image of
boxing. I once thought . . . he had that electric spark that might have turned him into a
combination of Joe Louis, Jack Dempsey, Rocky Marciano, and Willie Mays. However,
he’s thrown it away.” Obviously, Dooley was no fan of Ali. On 28 April 1967, a few
hours after Ali had refused induction, and before Ali had even stepped into a courtroom
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to defend his actions, Edwin Dooley appeared before reporters to deliver a statement.
“His refusal to enter the service is regarded by the commission to be detrimental to the
best interests of boxing,” Dooley began, before explaining that he had vacated Ali’s
heavyweight title. 89
Not all of Ali’s opponents focused on abstractions. In Louisville, moments after
Dooley’s announcement, the president of the World Boxing Association Bob Evans told
a reporter that “I feel Ali has violated the laws of the United States regarding Selective
Service. His action today leaves me no alternative.” Bob Evans vacated Ali’s title
because of his “action” not because he somehow damaged the “interests of boxing.”
(That said, only a criminal prosecution could legally determine “law-breaking”; perhaps
this is why Evans qualified his remark with “I feel . . . .”) In response to the actions of
Dooley and the WBA, the State Athletic commissions of Texas and California, as well as
the Las Vegas City Commission, also vacated the title. These commissions effectively
barred Ali from boxing in the United States. After hearing of the actions of the U.S.
commissions, the British Boxing Board of Control and the European Boxing Union also
stripped Ali of the title.90
On 20 June 1967 Muhammad Ali sat in a Houston courtroom, being tried by an
all white jury for refusing induction. Ali paid little attention during the proceedings,
instead chewing gum, drawing pictures, and waving to a little girl in the audience, until
United States Attorney Mort Susman suggested that Ali’s involvement with the Nation of
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Islam had led to his refusal. “If I can say so, sir,” Ali spoke up “my religion is not
political in no way.” Hayden Covington, Ali’s attorney, also challenged the remark.
When the jury returned with a guilty verdict, Ali requested that the judge pronounce the
sentence immediately so that he would “be able to sleep.” Susman indicated to the judge
that the United States would not object to a lighter sentence, given that “the only record
he has is a minor traffic offense.” The judge refused, and sentenced Ali to the maximum:
five years in prison and a $10,000 fine. Afterwards, Ali showed reporters the drawings
that he had made during the hearing. One drawing portrayed an airplane “flying over a
heavily wooded mountain range toward the rising sun.”91
In August Ali appeared before a judge in Houston to seek permission to go to
Japan for a fight against Oscar Bonavena in Tokyo. Joe Ingraham, the Federal District
Court Judge, refused to let Ali fight abroad, and ordered the boxer to surrender his
passport to the court. Unable to fight in the United States, and prevented from leaving
the country, Ali had no recourse. The World Boxing Council and the Orient Boxing
Council followed this decision by declaring their heavyweight titles vacant as well.
Despite claims from the United Arab Republic and the World Muslim conference that Ali
was still the heavyweight champion, Ali could not defend his title, nor could he travel
abroad to mobilize international support. The actions of Edwin Dooley, a political
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appointee, his imitators, and Judge Joe Ingraham, a Federal judge, effectively silenced
Muhammad Ali in the summer of 1967.92
The actions of Edwin Dooley and his imitators threw the boxing world into chaos.
Dooley suggested that an elimination tournament be held to decide the next heavyweight
champion. At the top of the list of contenders was a newly forgiven Ernie Terrell,
followed by George Chuvalo, Floyd Patterson, and Karl Mildenberger, all of whom had
been beaten by Ali. Rounding out the list were Jimmy Ellis—Ali’s old sparring
partner—and an unbeaten, but unproven, Joe Frazier. In an attempt to recapture
international interest lost as a result of Ali’s absence, fights were held in Europe as well
as the United States. Main Bout, Inc. was dissolved and Herbert Muhammad and John
Ali were dismissed. Robert Arum and Lester Malitz, two other members of Main Bout,
continued to work with Jim Brown because, as they said, the fullback had “class.” The
announcement of the tournament, as well as the end of Main Bout, Inc., following only
two days after Ali’s refusal, appear to have been planned well in advance.93
Ali, unable to box, found himself in financial straits. He owed considerable
alimony payments and lawyer fees to Sonji—who still used the surname Clay years after
the divorce. In 1968 Ali went to jail for a traffic offense, and worked in the kitchen of
the Dade County Jail. “They’ve got a million dollar champion tied up working for 40
cents a week.” He, along with 50 other prisoners, was given the “customary Christmas
amnesty.” On 22 August 1970 Ali’s second wife Belinda gave birth to twin girls. Added
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to these personal debts, Ali’s legal fees were growing as a result of his continued appeals.
By 1971 lawyer Bob Arum estimated Ali’s legal fees at $250,000. The actual figure was
much higher, Arum said, but Hayden Covington had not been paid as much as he had
billed, and the Legal Defense Fund and the American Civil Liberties Union had done a
considerable amount of work for free.94
To earn money, Ali branched out. He took part in a “computerized championship
bout” against Rocky Marciano. Marciano won in a thirteen round knockout, which the
stateside audience enjoyed, but when European viewers objected the film was re-edited
to show an Ali victory. Ali also sold the rights to his autobiography to Random House
publishing, and worked with a documentary crew on the film Cassius Clay AKA
Muhammad Ali, a retrospective of earlier fights. He also donated his time to select
causes. In August 1967, shortly after being denied permission to travel abroad, Ali
appeared as the Grand Marshall of a parade commemorating the second anniversary of
the riots in Watts. Less than a week after the parade, however, Ali refused an invitation
to speak at a meeting called by Martin Luther King, Jr. who was attempting to reconcile
the various positions of black activists. The majority of Ali’s public appearances—and
his income--came from lecturing to college students at universities.95
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During these appearances, Ali refined his message and presented another image,
placing himself within the struggle for African American power. Ali’s own sociopolitical views differed significantly from Dr. King’s. Ali supported the calls of Nation
of Islam leader Elijah Muhammad for a separate black state in North America. At one
point Ali declared “I don’t say ‘We shall overcome’ because I done overcame.” In his
prepared comments following his refusal to step forward, Ali declared that “We do not
believe this nation should force us to take part in such wars, for we have nothing to gain
from it unless America agrees to give us the necessary territory wherein we may have
something to fight for.” But Ali’s views of separatism also spoke to present-day realities,
a practical dissent. When a reporter asked Ali how a black separatist could sell his
autobiography to a white publishing house, Ali responded that “You wouldn’t want me to
ride white elephants, either. So I would have to . . . take off these white-made shoes and
ride on camels. We don’t make nothing,” Ali continued “we don’t make toothpicks, we
don’t make zippers to zip our pants.96
Ali also presented himself as consistent and unbending in the face of fiscal
oppression. “The power structure seems to want to starve me out,” he told a campus
crowd. “They want to stop me from working, not only in this country but out of it. You
read about this in the dictatorship countries, where a man don’t go along with this or that
and he is completely not allowed to work or to earn a decent living." At another
York Times 19 August 1967 Gene Roberts “Dr. King Stresses Pride in His Race”p12; 14 August 1967
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university, Ali declared “I could make millions if I led my people the wrong way . . . So
now I have to make a decision. Step into a billion dollars and denounce my people or
step into poverty and teach them the truth. Damn the money. Damn the heavyweight
championship. I will die before I sell out my people for the white man’s money.” When
speaking of the future, however, Ali claimed to enjoy the support of Allah. “Look at that
little robin pecking and eating. The Lord feeds the birds and the animals. Will the Lord .
. . let a man who is doing His work go hungry?”97
At universities Ali dedicated the majority of his lectures to promoting the Nation
of Islam and the Muslim faith. When speaking of his faith, Ali’s comments were neither
universally appealing nor carefully accommodating. He would explain that “dumb
Negroes come out dumber Negroes” after worshipping in Christian churches, and that
Jesus Christ was dead while Allah was a living God. When speaking to black audiences,
Ali would explain the Nation of Islam position that whites were the product of the “big
headed” mad scientist Yacub, and were in reality a race of devils doomed to destruction.
Ali also spoke of white oppression against blacks in the form of diet. Whites, Ali
contended, had convinced African Americans to eat pork—the inbred product of “cats,
rats, and dogs.” “The swine is the nastiest animal on earth,” Ali told one crowd “a
mouthful of maggots and pus.” He also claimed that the sound of bacon sizzling in the
pan was in fact the screams of thousands of bugs and worms that infected the muscles
and tendons of those who ate pig.98

97

Hauser, Muhammad Ali, 186-8

98

New York Times 6 February 1967 Robert Lipsyte “Muhammad Ali Shows Other Side”

76

Ali’s religious views also informed his beliefs about gender, beliefs that
contributed to a conservative image. In 1968 Ali spoke at a university in San Francisco.
The smell of marijuana smoke wafted above the attentive crowd made up mostly of
college students and others opposed to the war in Vietnam. The crowd laughed at Ali’s
jokes about the present heavyweight contenders, but the direction of Ali’s speech
changed quickly. After he apologized for offending the interracial couples in the crowd,
Ali said that “mixed marriages should be prohibited.” Boos began to echo through the
auditorium and the crowd drifted away. Ali responded to the crowd by saying, “People
just can’t stand the truth. They want to hear about violence or integration, but they can’t
stand the truth that can save them.” Ali’s views on women’s rights stemmed from a
mixture of the Nation of Islam’s highly conservative socio-cultural cosmology and
sections of the Koran. When a reporter asked Ali how he felt about the women’s
liberation movement, Ali responded “In the Islamic faith, man is boss and the woman
stays in the background.”99
However, throughout his ring career Ali challenged traditional gender concepts
and presented audiences with a redefined image of masculinity. Ali’s many relationships
with women suggested male chauvinism. Robert Lipsyte described Ali as “either coltish
or preening” around women his age or older, and Ali’s camp would regularly joke that
“the champ likes his foxes.” He also spoke often of his diet, made up predominately of
steak, and seemed to suggest that his food endowed him with a combination of social
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status and masculine power. But, Ali often spoke to reporters about his physical
beauty—his word—as well, and after fights would often declare “He never even marked
my pretty face.” Ali would brag about his grace and delicacy, and his ability to dance
around the ring, what some reporters labeled “prancing.” In the buildup to the 1964
fight, Sonny Liston told a reporter that Ali was a “fag.”100
If Muhammad Ali, however unwittingly, challenged gender boundaries, he was
clear about his own role in the world, a role that had been created by the actions of the
Federal government, the various athletic commissions, and the press. When commenting
on this role, Ali presented an image of himself as a hero for all time. “There are only two
kinds of men,” Ali told a college audience in 1969 “those who compromise and those
who take a stand.” At another lecture Ali declared “If necessary I’ll have to die for what
I believe. I’m fighting for the freedom of my people.” In Chicago, Ali told a reporter
“This is all beautiful, it’s better than boxing for me. All a man has to show for his time
here is what kind of a name he had. Jesus, Columbus, Daniel Boone. Now, Wyatt Earp,
who would have told him when he was fighting crooks and standing up for his principles
that there’d be a television show about him, that little kids on the street would say ‘I’m
Wyatt Earp, reach’?”101
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The struggle over the image of Muhammad Ali was not limited to a contest
between the boxer and his opponents. In the 4 April 1969 issue of Muhammad Speaks,
the Nation of Islam newspaper, Elijah Muhammad penned an article that began “I want
the world to know that Muhammad Ali has stepped down off the spiritual platform of
Islam.” The article, in reaction to an interview given by Ali about his desire to return to
boxing, continued “This statement is to tell the world that we, the Muslims, are not with
Mr. Muhammad Ali in his desire to work in the sports world.” A week later, Elijah
Muhammad prepared another statement that read: “Muhammad Ali is out of the circle of
the brotherhood of the followers of Islam for one year. We shall call him Cassius Clay.
We take away the name of Allah from him, until he proves himself worthy of that name.”
Attempts by reporters to gain more details of the dismissal were met with “very polite
refusals to talk.” Elijah Muhammad claimed that Ali was not religious enough,
contradicting Ali’s own claims of religiosity and echoing those of his adversaries. This
announcement meant that Ali could not “speak to, visit with or be seen with any
Muslim,” nor could he take part in any Muslim religious activity.102
Stripped of his primary supporters in the Nation of Islam, Ali connected himself
to black power advocates, albeit symbolically. In the fall of 1969, Muhammad Ali, still
banned from the Nation of Islam, signed a contract to appear in the Broadway Musical
“Big Time Buck White,” about a black power leader. Ali donned a fake beard and a wig
for the show, and all expletives were deleted at his request. The play, aside from several
song and dance numbers—Ali would not dance because, he felt, it was beneath him as
102
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champion—also had a scripted question and answer segment. When an actor asked Ali,
as Buck White, what would happen if the goal of black power was thwarted, Ali replied:
“What’s going to happen is that every black man is an angry man, even those who smile
in your face, they don’t like you. They smile ‘cause they have to.”103
Ali continued, “Now if we continue to be held down and tied to ghettos of
hopelessness, then our anger is someday going to burst in an explosion and that explosion
is going to unify all colored people in the world. Colored people are seeing the white
man’s quest for power as a definite threat to them . . . the black people and the brown
people and the yellow people and the red people and the disaffected, disillusioned white
people . . . they are making a black commitment.” The conflict in Vietnam, to Buck
White, was just another distraction, an “irrelevant explosion” designed to direct focus
away from the struggle for international equality. “If we have to,” he concluded, “we’ll
swipe your whole power and snuff out your souls like cheap . . . birthday . . . candles.”104
In the years since Ali was stripped of his title, dissent in the United States had, in
some sectors, grown conspiratorial and violent. Faith in the federal government waned,
conspiracy theories abounded, and stirrings of a violent revolution seemed apparent. In
1967, as New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison was conducting a private
investigation into the killing of President Kennedy, a Harris poll in the Washington Post
purported to show that sixty-six percent of Americans believed that the assassination of
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Kennedy was the result of a conspiracy. The Central Intelligence Agency violated its
charter and joined the FBI, the Secret Service, and the IRS to investigate domestic
antiwar organizations, and President Johnson falsely claimed that Communists controlled
the protest movement.105
If faith in the federal government was low, some groups attempted to take direct
action to challenge the social order. On 22 June 1967 the Federal Bureau of Investigation
announced that they had arrested 16 members of the African American Revolutionary
Action Movement. RAM’s first leader had been Robert F. Williams, who had fled to
Communist China, and the group had maintained and expanded on many of Williams’s
more violent ideas. Among the 16 arrested in New York and Philadelphia were Arthur
Harris, an unemployed 22-year-old, and Herman Ferguson, a 47-year-old assistant
principal, as well as other members of the urban working and middle class. The members
of RAM—men and women—were arrested with “30 weapons, more than 1,000 rounds of
ammunition, explosive devices, 275 packets of heroin, radio receivers and transmitters,
walkie-talkies and subversive literature.106
Described by the FBI as “a pro-Red China [group] and openly committed to the
overthrow of governments by violence and assassination,” the plans of RAM were no
doubt frightening to many. The group, according to the New York Times, had immediate
plans to assassinate Roy Wilkins, executive director of the NAACP, and Whitney Young,
the executive director of the National Urban League. Shortly after these prospective
105
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killings, RAM planned to kill other Civil Rights leaders, black and white. RAM
members then sought to blow up gas stations around New York, and to firebomb a New
York subway station during rush hour. The plot, which was well-planned and wellorganized, prompted a New York court to reactivate the New York Criminal Anarchy
Law of 1902, established in the wake of the assassination of President McKinley by an
anarchist, to try the RAM members. The law made it a felony to promote the violent
overthrow of the government, but the Supreme Court feared that the Law, as with most
sedition laws, threatened free speech. A reporter believed that the Court would loosen
Constitutional restrictions to try the RAM members, but would quickly intervene if any
local communities attempted to silence nonviolent dissent.107
In February 1968, months after the RAM arrests, Chicago mayor Richard Daley
addressed fears that inner city militants could spark riots at the Democratic National
Convention later that year. Daley commented that the leadership in Chicago slums had
shifted to militancy, and that black power leaders had recruited the urban poor to their
ideology. The police, in response to threats, had trained for riot control with sniper rifles,
shotguns, and tear gas and Daley stated that police officers would act as liaisons between
the F.B.I., Secret Service agents, the National Guard, and the Army. Although white
protestors were also expected to demonstrate at the Convention, Daley claimed that they
107
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were peaceful, while the militant blacks were more interested in violent confrontations
with police. Daley’s concerns were based on much of the inflammatory language (and
actions) of black militants. In this context, Ali’s quote—as Buck White—promising to
“snuff out” white souls “like cheap birthday candles” stands as a representative
example.108
Following Ali’s initial reclassification remarks, sportswriter Red Smith declared
that “Cassius makes himself as sorry a spectacle as those unwashed punks who picket
and demonstrate against the war.” Two years later, when Ali appeared on the British
“Eamon Andrews Show” (by satellite), American television producer Donald Suskind
connected Ali to the anti-war movement, criticizing him for being a draft dodger who
called for the destruction of the white race. Ali defended his position by reminding
Andrews that he was following proper legal channels. He had not fled the country like
many opponents of the draft. “I’m not burning my draft card!” he shouted. “I’m not
burning statues of the President!” Ali’s response to Suskind—that he was (more or less)
quietly following procedure--would contrast sharply with the activities of the larger antiwar movement. Eight months after Ali’s appearance on the “Eamon Andrews Show,”
violent confrontations erupted between the police and anti-war protestors.109
In August 1968, as delegates from across the country converged on Chicago to
select the presidential candidate for the Democratic Party, thousands of protesters filled
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the city to voice opposition to the Vietnam War. A legal demonstration in Lincoln Park
tuned into a scuffle when a protester lowered the U.S. flag and replaced it with a red
cloth. Police moved into the crowd swinging nightsticks, and the crowd began chanting
“Pigs are whores!” and “Pigs eat shit!” Amidst the confusion one demonstrator grabbed
a microphone and urged the protesters to disperse throughout the city. “If they use gas
against us,” his voice carried over the PA system “make sure they use gas against their
own citizens.” The National Guard had blockaded the exits of the park with sandbags
and mounted machine guns. They stopped the cars of local residents, and a TV crew
recorded a soldier, wearing body armor, a helmet, and a gas mask, point a grenade
launcher at the child of a civilian mother trying to go home.110
The tear gas eventually spread to the Hilton, where the delegates and nominees
were staying. At the corner of the hotel, two lines of police blocked what was left of the
protesters. In response to harassment by the crowd, the police charged the demonstrators
with clubs and mace and some chanted in unison “Kill, Kill, Kill.” Police pushed a group
of protesters through a plate glass window of a downtown bar, and the tear gas became so
thick that Hubert Humphrey, the Democratic candidate, was disturbed in his shower. For
seventeen minutes demonstrators fought with police in front of the Hilton hotel, all
captured live by television news cameras. Inside the Convention Hall, Senator Abraham
Ribicoff, after learning of the melee outside, criticized the Chicago police’s “Gestapo
tactics.” Chicago mayor Richard Daley, obviously ruffled and in full view of network
television cameras, shouted in response “Fuck you, you Jew son of a bitch! You lousy
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motherfucker! Go home!” The sound of his voice was deleted, but evening news shows
showed his statement.111
Not all threats to order were met with overt violence, however, and in another
instance officials attempted to prevent disturbances by loosening restrictions imposed by
the legal system of the United States. Two months after Daley’s initial statements about
law and order, Martin Luther King, Jr. was assassinated in Memphis. In the wake of the
murder, Army troops were sent to Chicago, Washington, and Baltimore to quell “civil
disturbances,” and officials speculated that troops would have to be sent to Detroit,
Pittsburg, and Memphis. Following the riots, Army officials prepared plans to dispatch
10,000 soldiers each to 25 U.S. cities simultaneously in case of future outbreaks of
violence. The logistical challenge of moving 250,000 soldiers throughout the continental
United States presented a problem to Army officials, however, and they decided that
accurate intelligence was crucial to ensure proper deployment.112
The Army activated 1,2000 domestic intelligence investigators—most of whom
had previously conducted background checks for the defense industry—and ordered
those field agents to study urban slums with the “greatest discontent,” and where
relationships between locals and the police were poor. Army intelligence officers were
spying on African American civilians and “were operating on their own initiative in a
way that was hard to control from Washington.” These agents tapped phones,
intercepting a call made by Democratic presidential candidate Eugene McCarthy in the
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summer of 1968. Another group of Army Intelligence agents grew beards, painted a van
with a fake television logo, and parked outside of the main auditorium at the Democratic
National Convention in Chicago, where they took photographs of “suspicious
individuals.” “I honestly believe we drifted into this area [gathering of Army intelligence
domestically] without quite realizing what we were getting into,” Robert Jordan, general
counsel to the Army told a Senate investigating committee in 1970. The practice had
been discontinued in 1969 when the Undersecretary of the Army declared that domestic
intelligence gathering by the military was “potentially dangerous” and “might make
people fearful,” but defended the Army’s encroachment on civil liberties “because no one
else was around to do the job.”113
This was not true. Muhammad Ali had been subjected to surveillance following a
1967 FBI memorandum claiming that the Nation of Islam was a paramilitary group bent
on the destruction of the white race. The declaration stated that Ali “has utilized his
position as a nationally known [sports] figure . . . [to promote] an ideology completely
foreign to the basic American ideals of equality and justice for all.” The Justice
Department clearly believed that Muhammad Ali was as threatening to the social order as
any revolutionary or anti-war organization. In 1969 the Supreme Court agreed to hear an
appeal by Muhammad Ali’s lawyers when a report surfaced that secret wiretaps
conducted by the FBI had intercepted telephone calls made by the boxer. The Justice
Department, fearing that sensitive intelligence activity would be revealed during the
113
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hearing, protested the Court’s decision to consider the case. The Court sent the appeal to
a lower court, where the presiding judge was to examine the transcripts of the intercepted
calls in secret.114
The FBI, in their investigations into Elijah Muhammad and Martin Luther King,
had secretly monitored five of Ali’s calls. After the FBI destroyed the tapes, the judge
was forced to consult the logs of the recorded calls. The lower court judge ruled that the
information obtained from the conversations had not affected the decision of the earlier
court in finding Ali guilty of draft evasion, and the case failed to overturn the conviction.
It is impossible to reconstruct the actual conversations, as the FBI logs only provided
minimal descriptions. However, declassified F.B.I. documents concerning Ali show that
agents secretly monitored many of his calls, and one agent was instructed to keep
detailed accounts of Ali’s television appearances, including those with Howard Cosell
and Johnny Carson.115
The above paragraphs serve to illustrate the pervading fears of an imminent
armed revolution, a revolution inspired by and coincidental with, the rise of black
militancy, of which the deposed heavyweight boxing champion Muhammad Ali was a
symbol. The government wanted to be prepared for future problems rather than
attempting to address them; the judiciary loosened Constitutional protections of Free
Speech; the Justice Department employed the services of the CIA and FBI to infiltrate
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antiwar organizations; the Pentagon allowed the United States Army to gather domestic
intelligence, and state officials met violence with military occupation and overt violence.
The treatment of Muhammad Ali at the hands of various state officials was no different—
his refusal to step forward was met with swift action that blurred the lines of legality.
Ali’s legal representatives, however, continued to challenge the government’s actions,
and a case made by NAACP lawyers proved successful.
On 18 August 1970, lawyers from the Legal Defense Fund presented evidence
before a Federal judge showing that the New York Athletic Commission had licensed
more than 90 convicted felons—whose crimes ranged from embezzlement and robbery to
rape and murder—to box in New York. A brief was submitted to the court claiming that
Ali’s public persona had influenced the Athletic Commission’s actions, and his
membership in the Nation of Islam, considered “as controversial then as the Black
Panthers are today” also played a role. “It’s alright to be a rapist or a robber and get a
boxing license,” Michael Meltsner of the Legal Defense Fund said “as long as you’re not
political.” One month later, Federal judge Walter R. Mansfield ruled that Edwin
Dooley’s actions constituted an “intentional, arbitrary, and unreasonable discrimination
against [Ali], not the even handed administration of law which the 14th Amendment
requires.” Compared to more concrete forms of danger, and despite attempts by his
opponents to impose a threatening image upon him, Ali emerged as relatively
moderate.116
_____________________________________________________
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It had taken three and a half years for Muhammad Ali to get the decision made by
a non-elected political appointee overturned that had essentially ended his boxing career.
When the announcement was made in October 1970, however, Ali was in Atlanta,
Georgia, preparing for a fight with Californian Jerry Quarry. Months before the court
ruling, promoters had secured Atlanta as a venue for an Ali fight. The State of Georgia
had no state athletic commission, and State Senator Leroy Johnson and Atlanta mayor
Sam Massell had organized the fight as part of a “sports extravaganza” that included the
Atlanta Falcons and Georgia Tech. The fight was scheduled for late October, and a few
days before the bout Georgia Governor Lester Maddox—who was in the midst of a
reelection campaign—spoke out against the fight. Maddox, claiming that he was
defending the parents of servicemen, declared a “Day of Mourning” and attempted to
block the fight, but did not have the legal authority. “I hope Clay gets beat in the first
round,” Maddox declared “flattened out . . . to the count of thirty.” Maddox—a staunch
segregationist who equated racial equality with Communism--attempted to manipulate
Ali’s image to bolster his own standing among opponents of the boxer.117
The New York Times carried these comments and noted Lester Maddox’s use of
the name Clay as a way to insult Ali. Perhaps the statements of Maddox, coupled with
the Atlanta Constitution’s policy of using the name Muhammad Ali in the pre-fight
coverage, forced the New York paper to reconsider it’s descriptions of the boxer.
Following Maddox’s statements, and possibly recognizing its’ own complicity in shaping
Ali’s image, the New York Times changed from the earlier policy of using the name
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“Cassius Clay,” and used his Muslim name exclusively. The only evidence to this
change in direction is that the dates coincide—Lipsyte never mentioned what convinced
the Times editors to use Ali. It seems clear, however, that when the New York Times
found itself in the company of the segregationist governor Lester Maddox in using the
name Clay, the editors reevaluated their position and used the name Muhammad Ali. Not
all reporters accepted the name, however, as an account of pre-fight predictions by
sportswriters showed. Most sportswriters favored “Clay” to win and Muhammad Ali and
Jerry Quarry tied for third in the poll.118
In response to the Georgia governor’s declaration, Ali presented an image of
humble magnanimity. Ali, after hearing of Maddox’s “Day of Mourning” declaration,
replied that he did not know what that meant. A reporter responded that “It means it’s a
black day.” “Oh yeah,” Ali answered, grinning. “It’s gonna be.” Ali continued, “So
Governor Maddox has set aside a day of mourning . . . but I can’t blame the governor for
speaking what he believes. It would be hypocritical for me to condemn him for what I
do.” In the days leading up to the fight, Ali was especially careful to refrain from overt
political talk, for fear that the fight would be canceled. Even his normal braggadocio was
subdued. After telling a German television reporter that Quarry would be beaten in the
second or third round, Ali turned to American reporters and said “What I really said was
that if I produce the way I know I can . . . the spectators will realize it is no contest after
five rounds.” It was Quarry who raised a hint of controversy when he demanded to have
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a white official and remarked that he would not fight “with a colored doctor in [his]
corner.”119
The fight, held at the “dingy old Sports Arena” in Atlanta, fulfilled Ali’s
prediction. Quarry was badly cut in the face early in the bout, and the referee stopped the
fight after the third round. Ali’s first fight in three and a half years exceeded the
coverage given to his fights in 1966 and 1967. The bout was the largest closed-circuit
bout ever, shown in 205 theaters in the United States and Canada. Closed Circuit
receipts alone totaled $3,490,000. The fight was also transmitted via satellites to Europe,
the Far East, and Africa, free on home television screens. The city of Atlanta earned
five-hundred dollars from the fight—the cost of rental for the Sports Arena. Despite the
international and domestic television coverage, the fight also attracted an unprecedented
amount of support from the black community.120
Ali had enjoyed strong support from younger members of the African American
community since his first refusal to be inducted. A New York Times reporter had noted
that Ali’s refusal had generated “considerable emotional impact” on the streets of
Harlem, where some found “vicarious enjoyment and admiration of [Ali’s] decision to
fight ‘the man’.” Stokely Carmichael had described Ali as “my hero,” and Martin Luther
King had said “You certainly have to admire his courage. Here is a young man willing to
give up fame . . . willing to give up millions of dollars to do what his conscience tells him
119
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is right.” When Ali served as the Grand Marshall in the 1967 Watts parade, parade
chairman Billy Joe Tidwell said that Ali was chosen because “he epitomizes a new era in
the history of the black man in America.”121
In Atlanta, Civil Rights leaders and prominent members of the black community
showed considerable support for Ali, contributing to his image as an important member
of elite black society. Among the attendees of the Ali/Quarry bout in Atlanta were
Coretta Scott King, Whitney Young, Dr. Ralph Abernathy, Harry Belafonte, Diana Ross,
Sydney Poitier, Al Hirt, Hank Aaron, Clarence Williams, Adam Clayton Powell, and
Julian Bond. After the fight, Coretta King presented Ali with an award honoring the
memory of Martin Luther King. Mrs. King said that the award recognized Ali’s
contribution “to the dignity of man.” After the fight Bill Cosby joked with reporters that
he was the only person to ever silence the champ. “I met him about four years ago. He
was walking down the street and I walked up to him and said ‘You’re crazy.’” Cosby
said. “We argued and I won. I’m the only guy that can whip him.” If the fight itself
lasted only nine minutes, Atlanta Constitution editorialist Reg Murphy predicted that the
impact would be longer lasting. “It should have destroyed, once and forever, the
stereotype of black Americans as shuffling, nodding failures” since “thousands of black
Americans . . . have found success in the biggest possible way.”122
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In the years since Ali’s absence from the ring, the mood in many areas of the
black community had grown disillusioned and violent. While in 1966 the views of
Muhammad Ali and the Nation of Islam appeared dangerous and radical to many white
observers, by 1970, with the solidification of black militancy and the activities of more
radical groups like the RAM and the Black Panthers, Ali seemed somewhat moderate, if
not dated. Although Ali had enjoyed the support of the black community, where he
effectively balanced the more radical demands of Elijah Muhammad with the personal
appeal of more moderate leaders, it seems that by 1970 Ali had become more acceptable
to many in the American public. In many ways, however, Ali seemed to present himself
as more radical than before, and the buildup to his fight with the heavyweight champion
Joe Frazier illustrates this fact.
In an article for the New York Times, reporter Robert Lipsyte wrote that boxing
was now enjoying another “technicolor trip with Ali.” When Ali recited a poem
promising to knock Frazier “out of sight and the launching of a black satellite”—a copy
of a poem promising to do the same to Liston in 1965--Lipsyte suggested that Ali
sounded dated. Although “a symbol for many men of many different goals,” Lipsyte
continued, Ali had taken a long absence and seemed oblivious to the changing times.
Eldridge Cleaver, leader of the Black Panthers, had remarked that in Ali’s 1965 fight,
“the white hope for a Patterson victory was, in essence, a counterrevolutionary desire to
force the Negro, now in rebellion and personified in the boxing world by Ali, back into
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his place.” In his 1971 fight against Joe Frazier, Ali again presented this binary
opposition, projecting the image of an “Uncle Tom” onto his opponent.123
Ali told a reporter that “Nobody wants to talk to [Frazier]. Oh, maybe Nixon will
call him if he wins. But ninety-eight percent of my people are for me. Anybody black
who thinks Frazier can whup me is an Uncle Tom. Everybody who’s black wants me to
keep winning.” To another journalist, Ali predicted that “When he gets ringside, Frazier
will feel like a traitor. When he sees those [black] women and men aren’t for him . . .
he’ll lose a little pride.” Joe Frazier claimed that, while watching television one evening,
he saw Ali tell a reporter “The only people rooting for Joe Frazier are white people in
suits, Alabama sheriffs, and the Ku Klux Klan. I’m fighting for the little man in the
ghetto.” If Ali enjoyed the support of the elite African American community—evident
from the Quarry fight—he also claimed to represent those masses who were still
struggling to survive. Throughout the pre-fight buildup, Ali portrayed Frazier as a tool of
the white establishment, a “great black white hope.”124
The Muhammad Ali/ Joe Frazier fight was a massive undertaking that carried
enormous symbolic weight. The bout, held in the relatively new Madison Square
Garden, was Ali’s chance to regain the heavyweight championship title that had been
taken from him by Edwin Dooley and his imitators. It had the largest closed circuit
coverage ever, with 350 theaters in the United States and Canada filled past ninety
percent capacity, with an estimated take of 17 million dollars. Victor Solomon, the
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executive director of CORE, reached a deal with the promoters to show the fight, whose
proceeds would go to “benefit the black community.” And although some politicians still
used the bout to grab headlines—Oklahoma City banned the fight in public buildings--the
fight was transmitted via satellite to over 33 countries in Europe, Asia, and Africa for
free viewing.125
In the first rounds of the fight, Ali opted not to use his signature speed, and
instead stood flat-footed, seemingly in an attempt to knock Frazier out. Ali talked and
clowned, as if “this was his show and that he was privileged to stage-direct it as he
pleased,” but his performance in the early rounds was inconsistent, and Frazier was able
to corner Ali on the ropes. Later in the fight Ali found his stride, and in the ninth round it
looked as if Frazier was in trouble. Frazier, however, appeared unstoppable, and in the
11th round nearly knocked Ali out. Ali rallied to regain control of the fight, and won the
fourteenth round after defending himself during the previous two. Going into the
fifteenth—and final round—the fight appeared dead even. Both fighters were visibly
marked by the punishment of the earlier rounds; Frazier’s right eye was nearly swollen
shut and Ali’s jaw was considerably bruised.126
In the middle of the fifteenth round Frazier connected a left hook to Ali’s chin,
and Muhammad Ali fell backwards and landed on the mat. His old friend and corner
man, and the originator of the phrase “float like a butterfly; sting like a bee”, Drew
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“Bundini” Brown soaked a sponge in water and sprayed Ali. Ali rose quickly and
continued to fight through the round, landing several punches on Frazier, but the
knockdown had decided the fight. Ali lost to Joe Frazier by decision on 8 March 1971,
the first loss in 29 professional fights. Those watching on closed-circuit broadcasts saw
the knockdown punch replayed 16 times. Reporters noted that most closed circuit
audiences left the theaters before the playback reached the 16th showing.127
The fight was a blow to many fans in the black community, but Ali remained
philosophical. One onlooker at the fight screamed “Whitey wins again!” after the
decision was announced, but after the fight Ali was calm. “It’s a good feeling to lose,”
Ali said “A great leader has his followers. When the leader fails, his followers cry. I
don’t cry so maybe they won’t cry. I have to rejoice in defeat like I rejoiced in victory so
my followers can conquer their defeats, the tragedies every day, someone in the family
dies.” Less than a week after his victory over Muhammad Ali, Joe Frazier accepted an
offer to speak in front of the South Carolina State Legislature—the first time in forty
years a black man had spoken before the assembly. In his speech, Frazier joked about
beating Ali, and claimed that Ali had declared himself “God” before the fight. “Well
God,” Frazier asked in mock response, “How you feeling now?”128
Although Ali often feigned indifference, and never showed signs of fear or regret,
his legal challenges had run out. In April 1971 the Supreme Court agreed to hear a one
hour oral argument before the nine justices. Ali’s lawyer Chauncey Eskridge and Erin N.
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Griswold, the US Solicitor General, were each allotted a half hour to speak. The Justice
Department sent a brief to the court questioning Ali’s religious convictions, and
mentioned that the boxer had yet to be reinstated by the Nation of Islam as a Muslim
minister. Eskridge told reporters that he hoped that a landmark Supreme Court ruling in
1970 would help Ali’s case. The ruling stated that in order to receive conscientious
objector status a claimant need not be “religious in the traditional sense to be eligible for
exemption.” Instead, a draft-eligible youth need only to show that he held “ethical
beliefs of a religious nature.” A New York Times reporter reminded readers that in the
20 draft cases heard by the Supreme Court since 1958, the government had lost eleven of
those.129
If his prominence had been tempered by his failure to recapture the heavyweight
title, and his political views seemed moderate in comparison to the growing militancy in
certain sectors of the black community, Muhammad Ali still stood as a powerful figure of
dissent, especially concerning draft resistance to the Vietnam War. By 1971 domestic
opposition to the United States involvement in Vietnam had grown. The demonstrations
against the war increased, and although most Americans polled in 1970-71 disagreed
with antiwar demonstrators, the Administration faced a crisis. The Army of the Republic
of North Vietnam--considered a way to continue the war while diminishing US forces,
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and made up of South Vietnamese soldiers--was ill-equipped, suffered rampant
corruption, and faced mass desertion.130
Of central importance, however, was the level of dissent within the United States
military itself. By 1969, a New York Times reporter speculated that dissent within the
Army alone had a central core of a few hundred soldiers, with sympathy in the ranks for
the antiwar movement numbering in the thousands. The reporter counted over sixteen
underground “subversive” newspapers published by enlisted men, with the numbers
growing weekly. While those more “sophisticated and disciplined” recommended that
soldiers remain in the Army and fulfill their duties while voicing disagreement, other
newspapers advocated going AWOL and fleeing to Sweden or Canada. Anti-war
newspapers were published in Fort Dix, New Jersey, Fort Hood, Texas, and Fort Gordon,
Georgia, and a case in Fort Jackson caused considerable controversy. An interracial
enlisted group known as “GIs United Against the War in Vietnam” were arrested “on
dubious charges” by Army intelligence officers. The case became highly publicized, and
led many pundits to speculate on the effects of active dissent in the Armed Forces.131
Army officials, no less concerned about possible consequences, responded that
such action was a natural outgrowth of civilian resistance since both the military and the
antiwar movement drew individuals from the same age groups. The reporter noted that
some soldiers held protest marches while off-duty. Others employed tactics introduced
by civil rights demonstrators in the American South. But members of the black
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community had voiced opposition to the war well before 1969, and to many of them Ali
represented “a symbol of defiance . . . during a war in which 22% of the battlefield
deaths” were black, while African Americans made up only ten percent of the
population.132
In 1967 a reporter for The Nation traveled to the Kahn Hoi section of Saigon.
Kahn Hoi, situated across the river from the central district of the city, was home to Trinh
Minh, a “dirty, dusty” row of bars and nightclubs. This area, the reporter noted, was
favored by black soldiers to those clubs of Tu Do in central Saigon, where the white
soldiers congregated. Green Beret Sergeant William Barksdale told the reporter that he
found the predominately white clubs hostile—the Vietnamese women considered
themselves “white” and espoused the racial views of their white companions—unlike
Trinh Minh, where the food and music were reminiscent of black clubs in the US. After
a few beers, the reporter commented, the discussion at Kahn Hoi bars turned into what
Barksdale believed “would be thought by most Americans to be the views of militant
extremists.” Muhammad Ali and Stokely Carmichael were hailed as heroes for resisting
white authorities. “They may be mad at Clay and Carmichael for opposing the war,”
Barksdale said “but on the big issue they realize these fellows are on their side.”133
The “big issue” that Barksdale referred to was “What sort of United States
would the GIs return to?” For many in the black community both home and abroad, as
well as in the views of government officials, newspaper reporters, and the public at large,
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the beginnings of an answer to that question could be linked to the Supreme Court’s
ruling in Muhammad Ali’s case. In their pre-hearing brief, the Legal Defense Fund
claimed that “there are major implications in the case not only for Ali, but for many
Black Muslims who face [similar] sentences.” Some editorialists speculated that a
victory for Ali would result in mass draft resistance that could possibly end the conflict in
Vietnam. A Justice Department lawyer also expressed these fears when he said “If [Ali]
wins, all the Muslims will refuse to take the oath, and where will we get soldiers?”134
On the day before the Court announced its’ decision, Ali remained confident and
steadfast. “If the judge look at me in what I believe, they’ll vindicate me. But if they
send me to jail I’m not going to leave the country. You don’t run away from something
like that. When you go to jail for a cause, it’s an honor.” He again compared himself to
more overt forms of danger. “If I beat up a woman or robbed somebody or killed a man,
then I’d be worried.” The Court had spent the end of the 1971 session addressing
concerns about publication of the Pentagon papers. A Federal Court Order prevented the
New York Times from printing the papers, but the Christian Science Monitor uncovered
details of a 1962 plan to pull the United States military out of Vietnam. Justice Thurgood
Marshall disqualified himself from Ali’s case because he had acted as United States
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Solicitor when the initial case came up in 1967, and The New York Times noted that a 44 decision would uphold the prison sentence.135
On 28 June 1971 the Supreme Court of the United States overturned the
conviction of Muhammad Ali on the basis that his 1967 induction order was improper.
The Court’s decision details the developments of the case. Before his refusal to step
forward, Ali had appeared before his draft board in Louisville where he claimed
exemption from induction based on his religious beliefs. He was denied that exemption,
and he appealed to the State Board, who sent his file to the Justice Department.
Following procedure, the FBI interviewed his parents, neighbors, business partners, and
religious associates. Then Ali appeared at a hearing with his parents, a Muslim minister,
and a lawyer, and the presiding officer judged--using the FBI background report as well-that Ali was sincere in his objection to war and that the Appeals Board should declare
him a conscientious objector.136
As the Kentucky Appeals Board was about to recognize Ali’s conscientious
objector status, the Department of Justice wrote a letter to the Board “advising it that
[Ali’s] claim should be denied.” The Board, based on the advice of the Justice
Department, denied Ali’s reclassification and ordered that he appear for induction, but
gave no reason for the decision. After numerous appeals, several boxing matches, and a
world tour, Ali--all appeals lost--was ordered to step forward, and refused. He was found
135
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guilty and sentenced to five years in prison, fined $10,000, and he was denied a request
to leave the country to work. In essence, the Supreme Court’s decision stated that he
should never have been drafted in the first place. Four years after he was originally
found guilty and four and a half years after he was stripped of the heavyweight title, the
Supreme Court refused to decide Ali’s case on the grounds of his religious faith; rather,
they blamed the entire episode on the actions of the Justice Department.137
In order to qualify as a conscientious objector in 1971, an individual had to show
three things. First, that “he is conscientiously opposed to war in any form,” second that
“this conviction is based on religious training and belief “and third “that his conviction is
sincere.” The letter from the Justice Department to the Appeal Board argued that Ali’s
beliefs did not make him opposed to all wars but only certain wars. In answer to the
second requirement, the Justice Department claimed that Nation of Islam doctrine
stemmed from racial and political, rather than religious, categories, and that Ali would
not fight in Vietnam because he objected to United States policy as interpreted by Elijah
Muhammad. Finally, the Justice Department contended that Ali had not initially claimed
conscientious objector status, only after he was to be inducted. But the Appeal Board
failed to explain on which of the three grounds it refused to deny Ali’s appeal.138
The Supreme Court ruled that Muhammad Ali had met two of the requirements
for deferment. They found that Ali’s beliefs were founded on “religious training and
belief” and that he was “sincere in his conviction.” The court could not prove that Ali
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“objected to war in any form” because of the Muslim call to jihad—the holy wars of
Armageddon. Although jihad was a war of the spirit and mind, it was also a “bloody
war.” “When ye encounter the unbelievers,” Justice Douglass quoted the Koran, “strike
off their heads, until ye have made a great slaughter among them . . . O true believers, if
ye assist God, by fighting for his religion, he will assist you against your enemies; and
will set your feet fast.” Douglass supported Ali’s belief in the jihad. “Clay should [not]
be subject to punishment because he will not renounce the ‘truth’ of the teaching of his
respective church that wars may exist which are just wars.”139
Essentially, the Court could not prove that Ali met only two of three
requirements, but since the Louisville Draft Board had not explained why it had denied
his conscientious objector status, the Justices blamed the Board’s decision on the Justice
Department. They also scolded the Department. “Here, where it is impossible to
determine on exactly which grounds the Appeal Board decided, the integrity of the
Selective Service system demands, at least, that the Government not recommend illegal
grounds.” The decision listed several precedents—some of them sixteen years old-available to the Justice Department that would have stopped Ali’s induction in 1966.
“The long established rule of law embodied in these settled precedents” the Court
concluded, “thus clearly requires that the judgment before us be reversed.”
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